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Scientific Validity, Admissibility, and
Mass Torts After Daubert
Joseph Sanders*
The death of Frye v. United States,1 is no longer greatly ex-
aggerated. 2 Frye finally met its federal court demise in 1993.3
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,4 the Supreme
Court did what commentators 5 had long recommended and de-
clared that the "Frye test" did not survive the adoption of the
Federal Rules of Evidence. 6 The Frye test had declared inadmis-
* Professor of Law, University of Houston. Work on this paper was sup-
ported by the University of Houston, Environmental Liability Law Program. I
wish to thank Roger Park for encouraging me to write this article and the edi-
tors at the Minnesota Law Review for their careful editing. Special thanks are
due to Linda Gordon Hestor who contributed significantly to the quality of the
finished product. Space limitations precluded our plans for a longer, jointly-
authored article.
1. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
2. Commentators have announced Frye's death on numerous occasions.
See 3 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEmiNsTE'S EvIDmNCE
702(3), at 702-36 (1993); 22 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAm, JR.,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5168, at 86-91 (1978). Others have ar-
gued that Frye did survive the Federal Rules. See 1 DAvID W. LOuISELL &
CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 105, at 818 (1977).
3. Frye's continued vitality in state courts remains unclear. In an early
state case considering the issue, the Arizona Supreme Court sidestepped the
question by stating "we are not bound by the United States Supreme Coures
non-constitutional construction of the Federal Rules of Evidence when we con-
strue the Arizona Rules of Evidence." State v. Bible, 858 P.2d 1152, 1183 (Ariz.
1993) (en banc). For a valuable summary of state and federal law with respect
to Frye's status, see Roger S. Hanson, James Alphonzo Frye is Sixty-Five Years
Old; Should He Retire?, 16 W. ST. U. L. REv. 357, 372-90 (1989).
4. 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
5. See Paul C. Gianelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence:
Frye v. United States a Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 1197, 1245-50
(1980); Mark McCormick, Scientific Evidence: Defining a New Approach to Ad-
missibility, 67 IowA L. REv. 879 (1982).
6. In so holding, the Supreme Court stated:
The drafting history makes no mention of Frye, and a rigid "general
acceptance" requirement would be at odds with the "liberal thrust" of
the Federal Rules and their "general approach of relaxing the tradi-
tional barriers to 'opinion' testimony.".. . Given the Rules' permissive
backdrop and their inclusion of a specific rule on expert testimony that
does not mention "general acceptance," the assertion that the Rules
1387
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sible novel expert testimony that was not "generally accepted"
as reliable in the relevant scientific community. 7 Commentators
criticized Frye both for its unidimensional approach8 and for be-
ing too malleable to be useful.9 In Daubert, the Supreme Court
held that Federal Rule 702 superseded Frye and rejected the ap-
proach followed by a majority of courts.1 ° Not only does Daubert
mark the end of a long controversy over Frye's viability after the
Federal Rules,1' it also marks the end of debate on Frye's merits
somehow assimilated Frye is unconvincing. Frye made "general ac-
ceptance" the exclusive test for admitting expert scientific testimony.
That austere standard, absent from and incompatible with the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence, should not be applied in federal trials.
Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2794.
7. The D.C. Circuit reasoned as follows:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between
the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Some-
where in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be
recognized, and while courts will go a long way in admitting expert
testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discov-
ery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently
established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in
which it belongs.
Frye, 293 F. at 1014. Over the next fifty years, many jurisdictions adopted the
Frye rule. See EDWARD CLEARY, McCoRMICK ON EVIDENCE 606 (3d ed. 1984).
8. See Andre A. Moenssens, Admissibility of Scientific Evidence-An Al-
ternative to the Frye Rule, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 545, 559-64 (1984).
9. The "general acceptance" test can be strictly applied to exclude all but
widely accepted, mainstream scientific principles and techniques. See, e.g.,
United States v. Zeiger, 350 F. Supp. 685, 688 (D.D.C.), rev'd, 475 F.2d 1280
(D.C. Cir. 1972) (per curiam). Other courts have applied the test very liberally,
however, prompting some observers to conclude that these judges often do little
more than rely upon the opinion of a few experts. Gianelli, supra note 5, at
1209-11. As Gianelli notes, identifying the appropriate field within which gen-
eral acceptance must be achieved can be problematic because almost all scien-
tific techniques have received general acceptance in some narrowly defined
field. Id. at 1211 n.95. In addition, it is not always clear what facets of the
proffered testimony or underlying methodology must be "generally accepted."
See Steven J. Grossman & Christopher K. Gagne, Science and Scientific Evi-
dence II, 25 CONN. L. REV. 1053, 1055-57 (1993); see also United States v.
Shorter, 809 F.2d 54 (D.C. Cir.) (discussing expert testimony concerning com-
pulsive gambling disorders), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 817 (1987).
10. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993); see PAUL C. GLANELLI & EDWARD J.
IMWINKELRIED, SCIENTIc EVIDENCE § 1-5, at 8-13 (1993); see also U.S. v.
Smith, 869 F.2d 348, 350 (7th Cir. 1989) (affirming the continued use of the
Frye text).
11. See Edward R. Becker & Aviva Orenstein, The Federal Rules of Evi-
dence After Sixteen Years-the Effect of "Plain Meaning" Jurisprudence, the
Need for an Advisory Committee on the Rules of Evidence, and Suggestions for
Selective Revision of the Rules, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 857, 876-85 (1992);
Margeret A. Berger, A Relevant Approach to Novel Scientific Evidence, 26
JuRrsmxcs J. 245, 246 (1986); Bert Black, A Unified Theory of Scientific Evi-
dence, 56 FoRDHAm L. REVIEW 595, 625-58 (1988); Ronald L. Carlson, Policing
1388
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as the primary device for controlling expert scientific
testimony. 12
The timing of Frye's rejection is of greater interest than the
event itself. The Federal Rules of Evidence have been in place
for nearly 20 years and, for most of that period, the circuits have
disagreed about whether the Rules incorporated Frye. Yet only
now has the Supreme Court taken the time to resolve the issue.
One important reason for the Court's recent interest is a new
sense of urgency concerning the increasing use of scientific ex-
pert testimony and the role judges should play in monitoring
and controlling such testimony. The emerging belief that an in-
crease in "junk science" in the courtroom 13 requires greater judi-
cial vigilance in admitting expert opinion has fueled this sense
of urgency. 14 For example, the Judicial Conference Advisory
the Bases of Modern Expert Testimony, 39 VAND. L. REV. 577, 582 n.17 (1986);
Paul C. Giannelli, Scientific Evidence: A Proposed Amendment to Federal Rule
702, 26 Juxmmics J. 260, 263-64 (1986); Hanson, supra note 3, at 357; Ed-
ward J. Imwinkelried, The 'Bases" of Expert Testimony: The Syllogistic Struc-
ture of Scientific Testimony, 67 N.C. L. REV. 1, 5-7 (1988); Frederick B. Lacey,
Scientific Evidence, 24 Juux cs J. 254, 266 (1984); Frederic I. Lederer,
Resolving the Frye Dilemma-A Reliability Approach, 26 Juramimcs J. 240,
240 (1986); Moenssens, supra note 8, at 545; James E. Storrs, Frye v. U.S. Re-
structured and Revitalized: A Proposal to Amend Federal Rule 702, 26
JuRAETmcs J. 249, 250-52 (1986). The Rules' failure to clarify the standard for
admitting novel scientific evidence, once called "the greatest single oversight in
the Rules," precipitated this extensive literature. Becker & Orenstein, supra,
at 877.
12. See David Bernstein, Out of the Fryeing Pan and into the Fire: The
Expert Witness Problem in Toxic Tort Litigation, 10 REV. LrniG. 117 (1990);
John D. Borders, Fit to be Fryed: Frye v. United States and the Admissibility of
Novel Scientific Evidence, 77 Ky. L.J. 849 (1989); Gianelli, supra note 5; Freder-
ick A. Bechtold, Note, The Admissibility of Scientific Evidence? DNA Print Iden-
tification, 19 STETSON L. REV. 245 (1989); Dirk Eshleman, Note, Different
Standards and Conflicting Results: A Re-Evaluation of the Frye Test for Admit-
ting Novel Scientific Evidence in Light of Decisions Involving Spectrographic
Evidence Introduction, 5 REV. LIG. 327 (1986).
13. PETER HUBER, GALmIEo's REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM 6
(1991) [hereinafter HUBER, GALmEo's REVENGE]; PETER HUBER, LIABILITY: THE
LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 43-44 (1988); Peter Huber, Junk
Science in the Courtroom, 26 VAL. U. LAw REV. 723 (1992); see KUNZWEIL ET. AL,
THE ENvIRONMENTAL EXPERT AFTER RUBANICK AND CHRISTOPHERSEN: BEWARE
THE JABBERWOCO! 1 (1991); Jeffrey K Sherwood, In Re Paoli Railroad: The
Third Circuit Punts to the "Coffincorner," ToxIcs L. REP., Nov. 14, 1990, at 773,
781 (criticizing the Third Circuit's approach giving plaintiffs' experts leeway in
valuing non-tangible injuries).
14. See Chaulk v. Volkswagen of America, Inc. 808 F.2d 639, 644 (7th Cir.
1986); Stoleson v. United States, 708 F.2d 1217, 1222 (7th Cir. 1983); E. Donald
Elliott, Toward Incentive-Based Procedure: Three Approaches for Regulating
Scientific Evidence, 69 B.U. L. REV. 487, 489-93 (1989); Barry M. Epstein &
Marc S. Klein, The Use and Abuse of Expert Testimony in Product Liability Ac-
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Committee on Civil Rules, intending to curtail the use of expert
testimony, recently proposed a change to Federal Rule 702 that
would allow expert testimony only if it is "reasonably reliable
and will substantially assist the factfinder."15
These developments were not lost on the Supreme Court.
After dispensing with the Frye rule, the Court outlined the trial
judge's gate keeping role. 16 The Court's discussion raises two
primary questions addressed in this Article: what approach
should courts employ in assessing the admissibility of expert sci-
entific opinion and, given this approach, how restrictive should
courts be in allowing expert opinion into evidence?
Part H reviews Daubert's approach to admissibility. This
Article argues that the concept of scientific validity lies at the
heart of the Court's approach to admissibility. By taking this
tions, 17 SETON HALL L. REV. 656, 656-59 (1987); Michael S. McCarthy, Note,
"Helpful" or "Reasonably Reliable?:" Analyzing the Expert Witness's Methodol-
ogy Under Federal Rules of Evidence 702 and 703, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 350
(1992); see also John Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52
U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 835 (1985) (noting that judges select and commission ex-
pert witnesses in German trials); Jack B. Weinstein, Improving Expert Testi-
mony, 20 U. RICH. L. REV. 473, 482 (1986) (observing that the Federal Rules
allow parties to use expert testimony "to obfuscate what would otherwise be a
simple case"). But see Peter Bell, Strict Scrutiny of Scientific Evidence: A Bad
Idea Whose Time Has Come, PRODUCT SAFETY & LLABLrrY REP., Jan. 17, 1992,
at 79.
15. The proposed rule would read, in relevant part:
Testimony providing scientific, technical, or other specialized informa-
tion, in the form of an opinion or otherwise, may be permitted only if
(1) the information is reasonably reliable and will substantially assist
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue and (2) the witness is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education to provide such testimony.
COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF
THE UNITED STATES, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 83
(1991) (emphasis omitted). With respect to these changes, the committee noted:
[T]he revision requires that expert testimony be "reasonably reliable"
and "substantially assist" the fact-finder. The rule does not mandate a
return to the strictures of Frye v. United States, 293 F.2d [sic] 1013
(D.C. Cir., 1923) (requiring general acceptance of the scientific prem-
ises on which the testimony is based). However, the court is called
upon to reject testimony that is based upon premises lacking any sig-
nificant support and acceptance within the scientific community or
that otherwise would be only marginally helpful to the fact-finder.
Id. at 84. For a critique of the proposed change, see Jack B. Weinstein, Rule
702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence is Sound; It Should Not Be Amended, 138
F.R.D. 631 (1991). The Judicial Conference Committee has deferred action and
referred the issue to the new Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence. SuMMARY OF THE REPORT OF THE COMMITrEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE 11-12 (1992).
16. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2795-98.
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approach, the Court has invited judges to dispense with surro-
gate measures of scientific validity and to investigate the issue
directly.1 7 Even though scientific validity is central to the
Court's approach, the Court failed to sufficiently develop the
concept in its opinion. Part III argues that this deficiency prin-
cipally stems from the Court's failure to recognize that scientific
validity has multiple meanings and is always a matter of degree.
This Part illustrates this deficiency by sketching out four differ-
ent threats to the validity of scientific research.
Although the Daubert Court devoted significant attention to
how courts should approach the admissibility of scientific evi-
dence, it largely failed to define how restrictive courts should
be. i8 The Court failed to offer any realistic examples to clarify
what it means to call an expert's methodology, data, or reason-
ing invalid.' 9 Rather, the Court offered little more than the gen-
eral observation that courts should judge the admissibility of
scientific evidence on the basis of scientific principles of reliabil-
ity and validity. In this regard, Daubert suffers from an ailment
frequently attributed to Frye: it provides little guidance on how
to apply Rule 703 in actual cases. The wide variation in the way
the courts have applied Rules 702 and 703 in the past does little
to clarify the issue.20 Despite the Supreme Court's silence, how-
17. See Bert Black et. al, Science and the Law in the Wake of Daubert: The
Supreme Court Launches a New Search for Scientific Knowledge, 72 Tax. L.
REv. (forthcoming 1994) (manuscript at 29-30, on file with author).
18. The Daubert Court did reject the argument that relevancy alone should
govern the admissibility of scientific evidence. 113 S. Ct. at 2795.
19. The Court's unenlightening example concluded that a purported rela-
tionship between the existence of a full moon and the probability that an indi-
vidual was unusually likely to have behaved irrationally would not satisfy its
scientific validity standard. Id. at 2796.
20. See Bernstein, supra note 12, at 133-35; Eshleman, supra note 12, at
328-31. For example, the District of Columbia Circuit adopted a very passive
stance in Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 1062 (1984). The plaintiff claimed that exposure to paraquat, a herbi-
cide, caused his lung disease. Id. at 1532. Two of the plaintiffs treating physi-
cians proffered expert testimony on the causality issue. Id. at 1533. They
based their opinion that paraquat exposure caused the plaintiff's disease on
clinical observations of the plaintiff and the fact that one expert had identified
other "similar" cases. Id. The court did not examine the scientific validity of
this testimony, allowing the experts to testify and affirming a jury verdict for
the plaintiff, noting that: "On questions such as these, which stand at the fron-
tier of current medical and epidemiological inquiry, if experts are willing to tes-
tify that such a link exists, it is for the jury to decide whether to credit such
testimony." Id. at 1534-39. The Ferebee court's description of the evidence as a
"classic battle of the experts, a battle in which the jury must decide the victor,"
has been cited frequently. Id. at 1535. For a discussion of the Ferebee opinion,
see Troyen A. Brennan, Causal Chains and Statistical Links: The Role of Sci-
1994] 1391
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ever, the degree to which a court may aggressively act to keep an
expert's proffered testimony from the jury presents the critical
issue surrounding admissibility.21
This Article approaches this issue in the light of scientific
evidence concerning the drug Bendectin. Some of the most re-
strictive admissibility determinations in recent years, including
Daubert itself, have occurred in cases involving this drug.22
Part IV reviews several Bendectin cases in which the court ex-
cluded the plaintiffs expert testimony and re-examines these
rulings under a scientific validity standard. It inquires whether
this standard can support the Bendectin rulings or, to put the
question differently, whether the plaintiffs proffered testimony
in those cases was so invalid that a court could reasonably ex-
clude it on that basis? This Part concludes that most of the re-
strictive rulings are questionable under a scientific validity
standard.
Despite the fact that a scientific validity standard does not
justify such restrictive rulings, courts nonetheless have
expressed a willingness to restrict scientific evidence in this
manner. Part V provides two explanations for the judicial pro-
entific Uncertainty in Hazardous Substance Litigation, 73 CORNELL L. Rzv. 469,
496-97 (1988).
The District of Columbia Circuit, however, assumed a more aggressive
stance in Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., affirming a trial court's grant
of summary judgment for the defendant:
The question whether Bendectin causes limb reduction defects is scien-
tific in nature, and it is to the scientific community that the law must
look for the answer. For this reason, expert witnesses are indispensa-
ble in a case such as this. But that is not to say that the court's hands
are inexorable tied, or that it must accept uncritically any sort of opin-
ion espoused by an expert merely because his credentials render him
qualified to testify.
857 F.2d 823, 829 (D.C. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 882 (1989). The court
held that the expert testimony lacked an adequate foundation and was there-
fore inadmissible under Rule 703, distinguishing Ferebee on the ground that a
greater body of scientific evidence existed concerning Bendectin. Id. at 832. It
is not obvious why this distinction, even if true, should lead to the conclusion
that the plaintiff's evidence lacked an adequate foundation in Richardson but
not in Ferebee.
Divergent views can also be found at the trial level. Compare, for example,
Wells v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 615 F. Supp. 262 (N.D. Ga. 1985) (follow-
ing a passive approach comparable to Ferebee), affd, 788 F.2d 741 (11th Cir.)
(reducing damages), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 850 (1986), with In re "Agent Or-
ange" Products Liability Litigation, 597 F. Supp. 740 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (following
a more restrictive approach comparable to Richardson), aff'd, 818 F.2d 145 (2d
Cir. 1987).
21. Black et. al., supra note 17, at 49.
22. See, e.g., Richardson, 857 F.2d at 829 (addressing the issue of whether
Benedictin causes limit reduction defects).
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pensity to exclude scientific evidence: courts want to achieve ju-
dicial efficiency and to improve jury decision making by
shielding juries from marginal science. The first objective is es-
pecially salient in mass tort cases or any situation in which the
same expert testimony is repeatedly presented.23 The second
objective is relevant in all cases, including mass torts, that in-
volve a complex body of scientific data. Although these are rea-
sonable objectives, restrictive admissibility rulings should not be
the primary means of achieving them. Several factors make re-
strictive evidentiary rulings especially ill-suited devices for con-
trolling the flow of information to juries. First, achieving
consistency across different types of cases is very difficult if not
impossible. Second, and more importantly, marginal science is
not the primary reason juries encounter substantial difficulty
with scientific evidence. Rather, the primary source of difficulty
is the way in which the legal process presents scientific evidence
to the jury. Part VI recognizes that restrictive admissibility rul-
ings do little to solve this problem and proposes some alterna-
tives that will assist the fact finder in understanding and
weighing scientific testimony in complex cases.
II. THE DAUBERT OPINION
Jason Daubert and Eric Schuler both suffer from limb re-
duction birth defects. They sued Merrell Dow, the manufacturer
of Bendectin, claiming that the morning-sickness drug, which
their mothers ingested during pregnancy, caused their defects.
24
The trial judge granted the defendant's motion for summary
23. For example, in the area of eyewitness identification, expert testimony
rarely deals with the specifics of a given trial. Thus, experts proffer essentially
the same testimony from case to case. See Roger Elliott, Expert Testimony
About Eyewitness Identification: A Critique, 17 LAW & HUMAN BEHAVIOR 423,
423 (1993); Joseph Sanders, Expert Witnesses in Eyewitness Facial Identifica-
tion Cases, 17 TEx. TECH L. REV. 1409, 1409-10 (1986). Appellate courts have
increasingly affirmed the exclusion of such testimony. See, e.g., United States
v. Harris, 995 F.2d 532, 534 (4th Cir. 1993); United States v. Curry, 977 F.2d
1042, 1051-52 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1357 (1993). But see, e.g.,
United States v. Stevens, 935 F.2d 1380, 1400 (3rd Cir. 1991) (reversing a deci-
sion excluding expert testimony); Campbell v. People, 814 P.2d 1, 8 (Colo. 1991)
(also reversing a decision excluding expert testimony).
24. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 727 F. Supp. 570, 571
(S.D. Cal. 1989), affd, 951 F.2d 1128 (9th Cir. 1991), vacated, 113 S. Ct. 2786
(1993). The Daubert and Schuller cases are among 1,700 or so cases brought
against Merrell Dow claiming that Bendectin causes birth defects. See Joseph
Sanders, The Bendectin Litigation: A Case Study in the Life Cycle of Mass




judgment.25 The trial court based its holding on several
grounds. First, the court held that only epidemiological evi-
dence is relevant to the question of whether Bendectin is a ter-
atogen26 and that the published epidemiological research
contains no studies that demonstrate a statistically significant
association between Bendectin and birth defects. 27 Moreover,
the court found that the plaintiffs expert reanalyses of existing
data, which purported to reveal a significant relationship, were
insufficient to satisfy their burden of coming forward with sta-
tistically significant epidemiological evidence.28 Thus, the court
concluded that the strongest inference a jury could draw from
the evidence was "that Bendectin could possibly have caused
plaintiffs injuries," which was insufficient to avoid the defend-
ant's motion for summary judgment.29
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed in a two page opin-
ion.30 Basing its analysis on Frye, the Ninth Circuit held the
plaintiffs expert testimony inadmissible because its underlying
methodology diverged substantially from the procedures and
techniques generally accepted in the field.31
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, primarily to an-
nounce Frye's demise.32 Noting the sharp division among the
circuits as to Frye's continued vitality, the Court held that the
Federal Rules of Evidence superseded the Frye test.33 The
25. Daubert, 727 F. Supp. at 576. Daubert is but one of many Bendectin
cases resolved at the summary judgment stage. See Joseph Sanders, From Sci-
ence to Evidence: the Testimony on Causation in the Bendectin Cases, 46 STAN.
L. REV. 1, 11, n.35 (1993) [hereinafter Sanders, From Science to Evidence].
26. Daubert, 727 F. Supp. at 575. The court explained that all other evi-
dence lacks a sufficient foundation under Federal Rule of Evidence 703. Id. A
teratogen is a substance that causes birth defects.
27. Id. The court was incorrect on this point. See infra note 114 and ac-
companying text (noting six studies finding a correlation between Bendectin
use and injury).
28. Daubert, 727 F. Supp. at 575.
29. Id. at 576.
30. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 951 F.2d 1128 (9th Cir.
1991), vacated, 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
31. Id. at 1129-31.
32. 113 S. Ct. 320 (1992). The Court's refusal to grant certiorari in two
other Bendectin cases, which also resulted in summary judgment for the de-
fendant, reveals its purpose. See Turpin v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,
113 S. Ct. 84 (1992) (denying petition for writ of certiorari); Lee v. Richardson-
Merrell, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 192 (1992) (same). The Ninth Circuit's exclusive reli-
ance on Frye represents the primary distinction between these cases and
Daubert.
33. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2792-93
(1993).
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Court grounded its analysis in the language of Federal Rule 702
which reads as follows:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue,
a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, expertise, train-
ing, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or
otherwise.
3 4
The Court noted that the text of the rule did not preserve the
general acceptance standard, nor did its legislative history make
any mention of Frye. The Court thus concluded that a rigid
"general acceptance" standard would be contrary to the thrust of
the Federal Rules which were intended to lower barriers to ex-
pert opinion testimony.
3 5
Daubert is an incomplete opinion. The Court granted certio-
rari primarily to announce Frye's death and the ensuing discus-
sion of what standard should replace Frye is sketchy at best.
Although the Court was quite explicit that Rule 702 does not
incorporate Frye, it was far less clear about what Rule 702 does
require.3 6 The Court began by holding that Rule 702 modifies
Rule 402's directive to admit all relevant evidence.3 7 This hold-
ing rejected the argument that Rule 702 speaks only to the ex-
pert's credentials and that a court may admit all evidence
consistent with Rules 401, 403, and 703 if presented by a quali-
fied expert.38 Rather, the Court held that Rule 702 requires reli-
ability as well as relevance; evidence which is relevant but
unreliable is inadmissible. 39 This interpretation of Rule 702,
however, raises a fundamental question: What constitutes relia-
bility? Importantly, the Court turned to science to answer that
question: To be reliable, the offering party must have acquired
the evidence through the "methods and procedures of science."40
34. FED. R. Evm. 702.
35. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2794 (citing Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488
U.S. 153, 169 (1988)).
36. Daubert's record offered little on which to base a discussion of what
standard should succeed Frye. For this reason, Judge Weinstein argued that
the Court erred in granting certiorari to Daubert and that a better choice would
have been Christophersen v. Allied Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106 (5th Cir. 1991),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1280 (1992); see Prod. Safety & Liability Rep. (BNA) 10
(Apr. 12, 1993).
37. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2795.
38. See Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) 12-30 (Apr. 26, 1993).
39. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2795. The Court may have borrowed this analy-
sis from the Advisory Committee's proposed change in the language of Rule
702. See supra note 15.
40. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2795.
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In this context, evidentiary reliability is very similar to "sci-
entific validity."41 Although Daubert did not offer a systematic
presentation of what scientists mean when they use this term, it
did describe some broad parameters relevant to the validity in-
quiry. The Court emphasized that the 702 inquiry should be a
flexible one and that the factors set forth in other opinions 42 and
the legal literature43 may prove valuable in determining
41. Id. at 2795 n.9. Bert Black has proposed a modification of Rule 702
that would require scientific evidence to be based on "scientifically valid reason-
ing" in order to be admissible. Black, supra note 11, at 611.
42. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2797. Specifically, the Court referred to the
analysis in United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985). In Down-
ing, the Third Circuit held that the admissibility of scientific testimony on the
accuracy of eyewitness identification was "not automatic but conditional." 753
F.2d at 1226. In order to be admissible, evidence must survive the trial court's
preliminary inquiry. In an in limine proceeding, the judge should balance: (1)
the reliability of the scientific principles the expert employed; against (2) the
likelihood that the evidence may overwhelm or mislead the jury. Id. In addi-
tion, the trial court should examine the "fit" between the proffered scientific
testimony and the contested issues in the case. Id. at 1226. For a discussion of
Downing by Judge Becker, its author, see Becker & Orenstein, supra note 11, at
881.
The court in Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp. set out a similar test for
admissibility. 939 F.2d 1106 (5th Cir. 1991) (en banc), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
1280 (1992). In Christopherson the Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, sustained the
trial judge's grant of summary judgment to the defendant. Id. at 1116. The
plaintiff had argued that exposure to nickel/cadmium caused her husband's fa-
tal colon cancer. Id. at 1108. The en bane opinion established a four factor test
of admissibility:
(1) Whether the witness is qualified to express an expert opinion
[under Rule 702];
(2) whether the facts upon which the expert relies are the same type as
are relied upon by other experts in the field[, as Rule 703 requires];
(3) whether in reaching his conclusion the expert used a well-founded
methodology [under Frye]; and
(4) assuming the expert's testimony has passed Rules 702, 703, and
the Frye test, whether.., the testimony's potential for unfair prejudice
substantially outweighs its probative value [under Rule 403].
Id. at 1110. The court noted that these four factors "lend themselves to sequen-
tial application." Id. For a further discussion of the Christopherson case, see
Bruce James, Fryed Expert Witnesses: The 5th Circuit Takes Charge of Scien-
tific Testimony, 12 REv. LITIG. 171, 188 (1992).
43. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2797 n.12. The court cites 3 WEINSTEIN & BER-
GER, WEINsTEIN's EVIDENCE 702[03], at 702-41, 702-42 and Mark McCormick,
Scientific Evidence: Defining a New Approach to Admissibility, 67 IowA L. REV.
879, 911-912 (1982), both of which appear to have been taken from Black, supra
note 11, at 642, n.258. Weinstein & Berger list seven factors that a court may
use in assessing scientific evidence: (1) the technique's general acceptance in
the field; (2) the expert's qualifications and stature; (3) the use which has been
made of the technique; (4) the potential rate of error; (5) the existence of a spe-
cialized literature; (6) the novelty of the invention; and (7) the extent to which
the technique relies on the expert's subjective interpretation. WEINSTEIN &
1396
1994] SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE SYMPOSIUM 1397
whether scientific testimony is reliable. The trial judge should
determine whether proffered evidence is scientifically valid by
examining the reasoning and methodology underlying the ex-
pert's testimony and the "fit" between the testimony and the fac-
tual issue presented to the judge or jury.44 Generally, the
expert's theory must be both testable and falsifiable. 45 The un-
reliability of a procedure and its potential rate of error 48 may
likewise merit exclusion. 47
Moreover, the trial court may consider a number of secon-
dary, surrogate indicia of reliability. These include whether the
theory or technique has been subject to peer review,48 whether
the results have been published49 and, in a partial resurrection
of the Frye test, whether the expert's methods and reasoning en-
joy general acceptance in a relevant scientific community.50 Un-
like the Frye test, however, which determines the value of
BERGER, supra note 2, 702[03], at 702-41, 702-42, quoted in Black, supra note
11, at 642. Black also summarized eleven factors set forth by McCormick: (1)
the technique's potential error rate; (2) the existence and maintenance of stan-
dards governing its use; (3) the presence of safeguards in the technique's char-
acteristics; (4) analogy to other scientific techniques whose results are
admissible; (5) the extent to which scientists in the relevant field have accepted
the technique; (6) the nature and breadth of the inference adduced; (7) the clar-
ity and simplicity with which the technique can be described and its results
explained; (8) the extent to which the courts and jury can verify the basic data;
(9) the availability of other experts to test and evaluate the technique; (10) the
evidence's probative significance in the circumstances of the case; and (11) the
care with which the expert employed the technique. Black, supra note 11, at
642 n.258 (quoting McCormick, supra note 5, at 911-912).
44. "An additional consideration under Rule 702-and another aspect of
relevancy-is whether expert testimony proffered in the case is sufficiently tied
to the facts of the case that it will aid the jury in resolving a factual dispute."
United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1242 (3d Cir. 1985). In Daubert, the
Supreme Court did not directly relate its discussion of "fit" to questions of valid-
ity. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to apply that concept in this context. A
particular piece of research may support one conclusion and not another. This
is frequently a question of external validity. See infra part III.D.
45. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2796.
46. Id. at 2796-97 (citing United States v. Smith, 869 F.2d 348, 353-354
(7th Cir. 1989)).
47. The Court noted, almost in passing, that the "focus, of course, must be
solely on principles and methodology, not the conclusions that they generate."
Id. at 2797. This statement will likely generate a good deal of controversy.
Bendectin plaintiffs have already picked up on this point and argued that their
expert testimony should not be excluded under Daubert when its methodology
is sound and the defense only objects to the expert's conclusion. See BENDEC-
TIN Plaintiffs seek rehearing after CA 3 Affirms Defense Judgment, Prod.
Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) 2 (Sept. 1, 1993).
48. Daubert, 133 S. Ct. at 2797.
49. Id.
50. Id.
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science primarily through the surrogate of general acceptance, 51
the Daubert surrogates are secondary to a direct analysis of the
testimony's scientific validity.
Finally, the Court also noted that Rule 702 does not stand
alone. Rule 703 provides that a court may admit expert scien-
tific opinion only if the facts or data are "of a type reasonably
relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions
or inferences on the subject."5 2 Rule 706 allows the court to ap-
point its own expert when necessary.5 3 Finally, the court may
employ Rule 403 to exclude expert testimony when its prejudi-
cial effect or potential to confuse or mislead the jury substan-
tially outweighs its probative value. 54
In sum, Daubert clearly ended Frye's reign in the federal
courts. Rules 702 and 703 superseded Frye and supplanted its
"general acceptance" standard. Unfortunately, Daubert was far
less clear about precisely what these rules, especially Rule 702,
require. At the core of the Court's analysis of admissibility
under Rule 702, however, is the idea of scientific validity. The
51. See Black, supra note 11, at 629.
52. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2797. The full text of Rule 703 reads:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an
opinion or inference may be those perceived or made known to the ex-
pert at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by
experts in a particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the
subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.
FED. R. EvD. 703.
There has been confusion concerning the relationship of Rules 702 and 703.
See, e.g., Zenith Radio Corporation v. Matsushita Elect. Indus., Inc., 505 F.
Supp. 1313, 1318 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (discussing the general relationship among
rules 702, 703 and 704), affid in part, rev'd in part, 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983),
rev'd, 475 U.S. 574 (1986). Professor Imwinkelried has proposed that courts use
Rule 702 to regulate the expert's major premise-the principles and theories
upon which the expert bases its opinion, and that courts use Rule 703 to ad-
dress the expert's minor premise-how the principles and theories apply to the
facts and data in the case at hand. See Tmwinkelried, supra note 11, at 14-16,
16-19. When the expert's testimony follows this major premise-minor premise
format, Professor Imwinkelried's analysis may prove especially useful. Expert
testimony, however, is not always easily broken into these two categories. See
David Faigman, Struggling to Stop the Flood of Unreliable Expert Testimony,
76 MmN. L. REV. 877, 886 (1992).
53. See JOE S. CECIL & THoMS WILLGING, COURT APPOINTED EXPERTS: DE-
FINING THE ROLE OF EXPERTS APPOINTED UNDER FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE
706 (1993).
54. The full text of Rule 403 reads: "Although relevant, evidence may be
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of un-
fair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considera-
tions of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence." FED. R. Evm. 403.
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next section attempts to remedy Daubert's failure to define this
term.
III. THE VARIETIES OF SCIENTIFIC VALIDITY
Daubert's references to validity pose two primary problems:
the Court used the term as if it encompassed a unitary concept
with a single meaning; and the Court implied that validity must
be either present or absent and not a matter of degree. 55 Valid-
ity, however, is a complex concept with multiple dimensions.
For example, Cook and Campbell have identified four basic
types of validity: statistical conclusion validity, internal valid-
ity, construct validity, and external validity.56 Each may be
threatened to various degrees and in a number of ways.
A. STATISTICAL CONCLUSION VALIDITY
Statistical conclusion validity is an important consideration
with all quantitative data. The typical threats to statistical con-
clusion validity have been widely discussed.57 When research-
ers observe a co-variation between two variables, they may wish
to conclude, based on a statistical analysis, that the variables
are causally related. Tests of significance guard against the
danger that researchers will conclude that a relationship exists
when it does not. Typically, tests of statistical significance test
the null hypothesis that no relationship exists between two vari-
ables-that the relationship observed could be the result of
chance.58 Unless a relationship is statistically significant, the
null hypothesis will not be rejected.59 These tests, therefore,
guard against Type I errors, a validity threat that occurs when
one concludes that a relationship exists when, in fact, none
55. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2795,
n.9 (1993).
56. THoMAS D. COOK & DONALD T. CAMPBELL, QUAsi-EXPERIMENTATION:
DESIGN AND ANALYSIS ISSUES FOR FIELD TESTING 37-39 (1979). The authors do
not claim that this list is exhaustive. Id.
57. See, e.g., Michael D. Green, Expert Witnesses and Sufficieny of Evidence
in Toxic Substances Cases: The Legacy of Agent Orange and Bendectin Litiga-
tion, 86 Nw. U.L. REv. 643, 682-94 (1992); Sanders, The Bendectin Litigation,
supra note 24, at 342-45.
58. FREDERICK WILLIAMs, REAsONING WITH STATISTICS: HOW TO RnAD RE-
SEARCH 54 (3d ed. 1986).
59. By convention, the null hypothesis will not be rejected unless the
probability that chance caused a result is less than one in 20 (Alpha = .05) or,
occasionally, less than one in 100 (Alpha = .01). Id. at 59.
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does.60 Thus, a researcher may reject a causal interpretation of
an apparent relationship that is not statistically significant.
Recent interest has focused on the problem which arises
when researchers attempt to assess causation with respect to
rare events such as limb reduction birth defects. 61 Whenever a
study has a relatively small number of subjects, statistical tests
will fail to detect a significant difference unless the relationship
is quite strong. This may cause a Type II error, which occurs
when one accepts the null hypothesis as true when it is actually
false. This threat to validity is one of low statistical power.62
Researchers can employ a number of techniques to guard
against this threat, including meta-analysis which increases the
number of cases by combining the results of several studies.63
Two other threats to statistical conclusion validity deserve
special mention. First, there is the error rate problem. Re-
searchers engaged in a fishing expedition, sifting through a
large number of correlations in search of significant relation-
ships, will inevitably find some. For example, if one concludes
that a relationship is significant if there is less than one chance
in twenty (Alpha = .05) that it would occur if the null hypothesis
is correct, a study of sixty relationships will produce three signif-
icant correlations even if no true causal relationships exist.64
The unreliability of measurement techniques pose the second
threat. Epidemiological research depends on determining
whether individuals have or have not been exposed to a toxic
substance and whether or not they suffer from some adverse ef-
60. WILLAmMs, supra note 58, at 65-67.
61. Green, supra note 57, at 653.
62. Power is a function of the study's sample size, the size of the effect one
wishes to detect, and the significance criterion used to guard against Type I
error. JACOB COHEN, STATISTICAL POWER ANALYSIS FOR THE BEHAVIORAL SCI-
ENCES 14 (2d ed. 1988).
63. See generally FREDERIC MARC WOLF, META-ANALYSIS: QUANTrATivE
METHODS FOR RESEARCH SYNTHESIs (1986) (basic text on meta-analysis);
Thomas R. Einarson et al., A Method for Meta-Analysis of Epidemiological
Studies, 22 DRUG INTELLIGENCE & CLINICAL PHARmAcY 813, 813-23 (1988) (ap-
plying meta-analysis to Benedictin studies).
64. Thoughtful investigators assess their findings in light of this threat to
validity. For example, Shiono and Klebanoff examined births in Northern Cali-
fornia for 58 categories of birth defects. Patricia Shiono & Mark Klebanoff,
Bendectin and Human Congenital Malformations, 40 TERATOLOGY 151, 152-55
(1989). Bendectin ingestion was significantly related to three types of defects:
lung defects, microcephaly (small head size) and cataracts. Id. at 152. The au-
thors noted that three significant relationships out of 58 are "exactly the
number of significant relationships that would have been expected by chance"
when using 95% confidence intervals, and concluded that the three associations
"are unlikely to be causal." Id. at 155.
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fect. Coding errors occur when researchers treat individuals
who were not exposed as having been exposed and those exposed
as not exposed, or the researcher misdiagnoses the individuals.
Unreliable coding threatens validity by inflating error variance
and attenuating true relationships. 6 5
B. INTERNAL VALIDITY
Statistical conclusion validity presents a special case of in-
ternal validity, which Cook and Campbell define as "the approxi-
mate validation with which we infer that a relationship between
two variables is causal or that the absence of a relationship im-
plies the absence of cause."66 Threats to internal validity usu-
ally can be thought of as specification errors. Specification
errors occur when the researcher fails to consider a factor that
mediates the observed effect between two variables, either be-
cause it explains changes in both the "cause" and the "effect" or
intervenes between the "cause" and the "effect" and acts inde-
pendently on the "effect."6 7 Among the threats to internal valid-
ity Cook and Campbell discuss are history (the threat that an
observed effect may be due to an event that takes place between
two points of measurement when this event is not the treatment
under investigation),68 testing (the threat that an effect may be
due to the number of times responses are measured),69 and se-
lection (a threat that groups being compared are composed of
different types of individuals and, therefore, that observed dif-
ferences are due to factors other than the treatment under in-
vestigation).70 A basic advantage of experimental research is its
65. Plaintiff experts in Bendectin cases typically recode data in an attempt
to increase reliability. See infra part IV.B. (discussing reanalyses of epidemo-
logical data, in particular, those of plaintiff experts Dr. Swan and Dr. Done).
66. COOK & CAMPBELL, supra note 56, at 37.
67. See id. at 50.
68. Id. at 51. Bendectin defendants often introduce evidence indicating
that a measurable decrease in birth defects did not accompany rapid with-
drawal of the drug from the market between 1981 and 1983. See infra note 117
and accompanying text. Discovery of a new teratogenic substance, introduced
into the environment over this same period, would constitute a history threat to
the validity of the conclusion that Bendectin does not cause birth defects.
69. COOK & CAMPBELL, supra note 56, at 52. For example, a prior opportu-
nity to identify a suspect in a lineup may affect the courtroom identification of
the suspect.
70. Id. at 53. Selection effects take many different forms and often interact
with other threats to internal validity. One example of a potential selection
effect in Bendectin research derives from the fact that morning sickness is a
weak indicator that the fetus is healthy. See Margaret Weigel & Ronald Wei-
gel, Nausea & Vomiting in Pregnancy and Pregnancy Outcome, 96 BarriSH J.
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ability to control for many selection effects by randomly as-
signing individuals to treatments. 71 Of course in many situa-
tions, such as investigating the effect of toxic substances on
individuals, human experiments are impossible. In such cases,
the researcher can attempt to control selection threats by care-
fully matching cases and controls in case-control studies. 72
C. CONSTRUCT VALIDITY
The third broad type of validity is construct validity. Con-
founding operations intended to represent one particular cause
or effect construct with some other construct usually threaten
construct validity.73 What one investigator may interpret as ev-
idence of a causal relationship between constructs A and B, an-
other investigator may interpret as a relationship between
constructs X and B or even X and y.74 There are several sources
of construct invalidity. One, experimenter expectancy, occurs
when the experimenter anticipates a certain outcome.75 An-
other, evaluation apprehension, arises when the subject wishes
to please the investigator.76 Finally, hypothesis-guessing may
threaten construct validity when the subject attempts to guess
the hypothesis being tested and adjust his or her answers ac-
cordingly.7 7 For example, drug testing experiments often pres-
ent construct validity concerns because any observed effect
between the drug and a therapeutic effect may be due, not to the
OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 1312 (1989). Thus, women who took Bendectin
were more likely to have a healthy baby than women who did not. But see Anne
Kricker et al., Congenital Limb Deficiencies: Maternal Factors in Pregnancy, 26
AUSTRALIA-NEw ZEALAND J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 272 (1986) (study con-
cluding that "vomiting of (sic) pregnancy was associated with an increased risk
of longitudinal limb reduction defects").
71. CooK & CAMPBELL, supra note 56, at 55.
72. Even experimental designs cannot control for all threats to internal va-
lidity. For example, experiments cannot entirely control for differential mortal-
ity in treatment groups. Differential mortality obscures the interpretation of
other results because the remaining individuals in the two groups may no
longer be comparable on average. CooK & CAMPBELL, supra note 56, at 57.
This difference may be attributable to the treatment itself, such as when ani-
mals die from very large doses of a substance. See, e.g., Rochelle W. Tyl et al.,
Developmental Toxicity Evaluation of Bendectin in CD Rats, 37 TERATOLOGY
539, 540 (1988) (noting high "maternal mortality" in certain rat groups given
Bendectin).
73. COOK & CAMPBELL, supra note 56, at 59.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 67.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 66.
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chemical action of the drug, but rather to the psychological ex-
pectation that the pill will have a beneficial effect.78
Another source of construct invalidity is the confounding of
constructs and levels of constructs.79 One might conclude that A
does not cause B when the test involves very low levels of A. At
higher levels of A, however, the researcher might uncover a rela-
tionship.8 0 In an attempt to avoid this threat, laboratory animal
studies routinely expose animals to suspect drugs at more than
one dose level.8 '
A similar threat arises whenever one has but a single opera-
tionalization of the cause or the effect: a mono-operation bias. 2
Early animal studies failed to detect the teratogenetic effects of
Thalidomide, in part because they used species unaffected by
the drug.8 3 Even when there are multiple operationalizations,
the use of a single method to measure a relationship threatens
validity.8 4 Wherever possible, researchers should employ multi-
ple methods.
Assessing construct validity is frequently a question of con-
vergence and divergence across measures. One is much more
likely to believe that a cause and effect relationship exists when
different measurements and methods converge to produce the
same result.8 5 Similarly, researchers are more likely to believe
that a cause and effect relationship of a particular type exists if
there is a divergence between measures and manipulations of
related but distinct constructs. 86
D. EXTERNAL VALmiTY
Finally, there is external validity. Just as statistical conclu-
sion validity is a special type of internal validity, construct va-
78. Id. at 61. In an effort to increase construct validity, scientists have
designed methods such as placebo controls and double blind designs. Id. In a
double blind design, neither the subject nor the researcher knows who is receiv-
ing the treatment and who is receiving the placebo. E.g., A.G. Hendrickx et al.,
Evaluation of Bendectin Embryotoxicity in Non-human Primates: Double-Blind
Study in Cynomolgus Monkeys, 32 TERATOLOGY 191 (1985).
79. COOK & CAmPBELL, supra note 56, at 67.
80. Id.
81. Sanders, The Bendectin Litigation, supra note 24, at 323.
82. COOK & CAMPBELL, supra note 56, at 65.
83. Thalidomide is not a teratogen in all animal species. See Max Sherman
& Steven Strauss, Thalidomide: A Twenty-Five Year Perspective, 41 FOOD
DRUG CosM. L.J. 458, 461 (1986) (noting that Thalidomide is not a teratogen in
rats, mice or hampsters).
84. CooK & CAMPBELL, supra note 56, at 66.
85. This is known as convergent validity. Id. at 61.
86. This is sometimes called discriminant validity. Id.
1403
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78:1387
lidity is a type of external validity. External validity involves
the ability to generalize conclusions to particular persons, set-
tings and times and to types of persons, settings and times.8 7
Cook and Campbell list three basic threats to external valid-
ity,8 8 each of which can be expressed in terms of an interaction
between a treatment and some other factor. First, the potential
interaction between selection and treatment poses a threat to
external validity.8 9 If a study uncovers a cause and effect rela-
tionship, the researcher must determine to which categories of
individuals the relationship can be generalized. For example, if
a study includes only men as subjects, the researcher must de-
termine whether the results can be generalized to women.
Other examples involve the ability to generalize across race,
ethnicity, and class. Other, more subtle threats to generaliza-
tion may pose special problems in the courtroom. For instance,
jurors may rely upon the persuasiveness of experts as an indica-
tor of the merits of their position. Litigants select testifying ex-
perts in part for their persuasiveness and, therefore, the
assumption that a causal relationship exists between persua-
siveness and correctness may be unwarranted for the type of ex-
pert that appears as a witness in court.90
The interaction between setting and treatment creates a
second threat. A researcher may not be able to generalize stud-
ies done in one setting to other settings. All laboratory studies
are vulnerable to this threat.9 ' Even well crafted experiments
that do their best to increase external validity cannot insure
that their results can be transferred from the laboratory. Some
laboratory studies suffer from multiple threats to external valid-
ity. For example, some laboratory studies of jury decision mak-
ing involve college sophomores rather than actual jurors.92 The
subjects read a written fact pattern and each individual "juror"
renders his or her own decision, instead of the "jury" issuing a
collective decision after deliberation. 93 Likewise, laboratory
animal studies encounter difficulty in extrapolating across both
dose rates and species.9 4 Courts have frequently focused on
87. Id. at 71.
88. Id. at 73-74.
89. Id. at 73.
90. Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 Wis. L. REv. 1113, 1134 (1991).
91. CooK & CAMPBELL, supra note 56, at 74.
92. REID HASTIE ET AL., INSIDE THE JuRY 40 (1983).
93. Id.
94. See infra notes 125-131 and accompanying text.
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threats to external validity when refusing to admit expert
testimony.95
This brief review of validity's different facets indicates some
of the ways in which conclusions about causation may be in er-
ror. Statistical conclusion validity and other types of internal
validity concentrate on the danger of Type I or Type II errors,
drawing false positive or false negative conclusions about causa-
tion. Statistical conclusion validity deals with threats to inter-
nal validity caused by random error, the possibility that an
observed relationship could be due to chance. Other threats to
internal validity are due to the possible existence of bias
through factors that systematically affect the value of the means
of variables. 96 Construct validity and other types of externalya-
lidity concentrate on the danger of generalization. The principal
threat stems from the possible existence of an undetected inter-
action.97 With respect to construct validity the danger is that an
effect can be obtained using one measure, such as individual ju-
ror judgments, and a different effect using a different measure,
such as collective jury judgments. The risk of undetected inter-
action effects is even easier to see with respect to other threats
to external validity, such as the interaction between selection
and treatment.98 In each case, a relationship observed in one
circumstance may not apply in a different circumstance. The
next section employs these categories of scientific validity to dis-
cuss specific admissibility rulings in Bendectin cases.
IV. RESTRICTIVE ADMISSIBILITY RULINGS IN THE
BENDECTIN CASES
Bendectin has become a very important product, primarily
because it has precipitated a reanalysis of the judiciary's proper
role in assessing the admissibility of scientific evidence. For
nearly a decade, trial and appellate courts have wrestled with
the admissibility of plaintiffs' expert testimony that Bendectin is
95. For example, several courts, like the Daubert trial court, have resisted
the introduction of expert opinion based on animal studies because of concerns
about external validity. See infra text accompanying notes 125-29 (discussing
the external validity problem posed by animal studies); infra text accompany-
ing notes 134-48 (discussing courts' refusal to allow non-epidemiological evi-
dence such as animal studies).
96. CooK & CAMPBELL, supra note 56, at 80.
97. Id. at 81.
98. Id. at 74.
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a teratogen.99 This section investigates whether Daubert's sci-
entific validity analysis can explain and justify the Bendectin
cases' restrictive admissibility rulings and whether the excluded
testimony in those cases was so invalid that the courts properly
excluded it. The Article addresses this question in the context of
two specific themes that have arisen in Bendectin litigation: the
primacy of epidemiology, and the exclusion of testimony based
on a reanalysis of published epidemiological results.
A. THE PRimACY OF EPIDEMIOLOGY
1. Evidence of a Causal Relationship
Bendectin is a substance that is not obviously harmful.100
It does not produce a signature disease and no generally ac-
cepted biological theory exist about how it produces its alleged
effect. Moreover, the correlation between the product and the
plaintiffs' injuries is not strong. The evidence as to the causal
relationship between the drug and birth defects comes in five
basic types: structure-activity, in vitro research, animal studies,
epidemiology, and secular trend analysis.101
Structure-activity. Substances with similar chemical struc-
tures may have similar effects on the human body. Bendectin
contains doxylamine succinate, an antihistamine acting as an
antinauseant. 0 2 Some antihistamines are known teratogens
and plaintiff experts point to this structural similarity. 0 3
In vitro. In vitro research involves exposing cells or organs
maintained in a culture to a substance.10 4 One study indicates
that Bendectin inhibits certain limb bud cell differentiation'05
99. A list of all reported Bendectin opinions through 1991 can be found in
Sanders, The Bendectin Litigation, supra note 24, at 410-18.
100. See Louis Lasagna & Sheila R. Shulman, Bendectin and the Language
of Causation, in PHANTOM Risic ScrENTric INFERENCE AND THE LAW 100, 100-
01 (Kenneth R. Foster et al. eds., 1993). Other mass exposures that currently
fit into this category include exposure to Agent Orange, PCBs, certain toxic
waste dumps, breast implants, and electro-magnetic fields.
101. Joseph Sanders, The Jury Deliberations in a Complex Case: Havner v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 16 JusT. Sys. J. 45, 52-53 (1993) [hereinaf-
ter Sanders, Jury Deliberation].
102. Sanders, The Bendectin Litigation, supra note 24, at 317.
103. DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 946 n.8
(3d Cir. 1990).
104. See, e.g., Stuart Freeman et al., Post-implantation Embryo Culture for
Studies of Teratogenesis, in BIOCHEMICAL TOXICOLOGY: A PRAcTIcAL APPROACH
83 (K. Snell & B. Mullock eds. 1987) (assessing studies of teratogenesis).
105. John R. Hassell & Elizabeth A. Horigan, Chondrogenesis: A Model De-
velopmental System for Measuring Teratogenic Potential of Compounds, 2 TERA-
TOGENESIS, CARCINoGENEsIs, & MUTAGENESIS 325, 325-27 (1982).
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and another suggests that Bendectin may be a weak DNA dam-
aging agent.106
Animal studies. In vivo studies examine the effects of a sub-
stance on animals. Researchers have conducted Bendectin
animal studies on chicks, rats, rabbits, and primates.107 As
plaintiff experts note, some studies report a relationship be-
tween Bendectin or one of its ingredients and a teratogenic ef-
fect. For example, one primate study found that the drug caused
a delay in the closure of the ventricular septa.'08 On the other
hand, several studies have failed to find a correlation between
Bendectin and birth defects.' 0 9
Epidemiology. Epidemiological studies compare the inci-
dence of birth defects among those exposed to and those not ex-
posed to a substance. There are two general ways of making
such comparisons: cohort studies and case-control studies."10
Cohort studies compare the incidence of defects among groups of
persons exposed to the substance and groups of persons not ex-
posed."' Case-control studies match a group of persons who
have the injury in question with another group that does not
have that injury."12 The studies then compare exposure rates
for the two groups. Nearly 40 published epidemiological studies
discuss Bendectin. 1 3 In no individual study did the authors
conclude that Bendectin is a teratogen. In six studies, however,
the authors found at least one significant correlation between
Bendectin use and some injury and concluded that, although a
single study alone is insufficient to support an attribution of
causation, an effect might exist." 4 In the remaining 33 studies
106. John D. Budroe et al., A Study of the Potential Genotoxicity of
Methapyrilene and Related Antihistamines using the HepatocyteiDNA Repair
Assay, 135 MUTATION RES. 131, 135-36 (1984).
107. Sanders, The Bendectin Litigation, supra note 24, at 394.
108. A.G. Hendrickx et al., Evaluation of Bendectin Embryotoxicity in Non-
human Primates: Ventricular Septal Defects in Prenatal Macaques and
Baboon, 32 TERATOLOGY 179, 179-89 (1985); A.G. Hendrickx et al., supra note
78, at 194.
109. For a list of the published animal studies, see Sanders, The Bendectin
Litigation, supra note 24, at 403.
110. Leon Gordis, Estimating Risk and Inferring Causality in Epidemiology,
in EPIDEMIOLOGY AND HEALTH RISK ASSESSMENT 51, 52 (Leon Gordis ed. 1988).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. For a list of published epidemiological studies through 1991, see Sand-
ers, The Bendectin Litigation, supra note 24, at 404-06.
114. Pamela Aselton et al., Pyloric Stenosis and Maternal Bendectin Expo-
sure, 120 Am. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 251 (1984); Jose F. Cordero et al., Is Bendectin a
Teratogen?, 245 JAMA 2307 (1981); Brenda Eskenazi & Michael B. Bracken,
Bendectin (Debendox) as a Risk Factor for Pyloric Stenosis, 144 Am. J. OBSTT-
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the authors either drew no conclusion or concluded that no sta-
tistical relationship existed. 115
Secular trend. Secular trend data, which is similar to epide-
miology, compares the total reported incidence of various types
of birth defects with the volume of Bendectin sales and prescrip-
tions. This method investigates whether increases or reductions
in birth defects paralleled the rapid increase in Bendectin pre-
scriptions in the 1970s or the precipitous drop in prescriptions in
the early 1980s.
In recent years defense experts have concentrated their tes-
timony on the epidemiological and secular trend evidence. As to
the epidemiological data, Bendectin defendants have argued
that, taken as a group, the studies indicate that Bendectin is not
teratogenic. 116 They have also reviewed secular trend evidence
that indicates no significant decrease in birth defects after
Bendectin manufacturers withdrew the product from the mar-
RiCS & GYNECOLOGY 919 (1982); G.T. Gibson et al., Congenital Anomalies in
Relation to the Use of Doxylamine/Dicyclomine and other Antenatal Factors:
An Ongoing Prospective Study, 1981 MED. J. AUSTL. 410 (1981); J. Golding et
al., Maternal Anti-nauseants and Clefts of Lip and Palate, 1983 HUMAN Toxi-
COLOGY 63 (1983); Kenneth J. Rothman et al., Exogenous Hormones and Other
Drug Exposures of Children with Congenital Heart Disease, 109 AM. J. EPIDMEMI-
OLOGY 433, 435 (1979).
115. Sanders, The Bendectin Litigation, supra note 24, at 395.
116. Einarson, Leeder & Koren included 17 studies in a meta-analysis ex-
amining whether first-trimester Bendectin ingestion caused any birth defect.
See Einarson et al., supra note 63. The overall odds ratio was 1.01, X2 = 0.05, p
= 0.815. They also conducted separate meta-analyses for cohort and case con-
trol studies. For cohort studies (N = 12) the ratio was 0.95, X2 = 0.66, p = 0.418.
For case control (N = 5) studies the ratio was 1.27, X2 = 2.71, p = 0.10. Id. at
819-20. The authors concluded that these meta-analyses confirm previous sub-jective analyses that Bendectin is not associated with human teratogenic out-
comes. Id. at 822; see also Leslie J. Sheffield & Ron Batagol, The Creation of
Therapeutic Orphans-Or, What Have We Learnt From the Debendox Fiasco?,
143 MED. J. AUSTL. 143, 144-45 (1985) (noting "great uniformity" in studies
"finding no teratogenic effect of Debendox").
The odds ratio is the cross product in a 2 x 2 table. In a cohort study exam-
ining exposed and unexposed individuals, the odds ratio is the ratio of the odds
of injury if the person was exposed, to the odds of injury if the person was not
exposed.
ODDS RATIO IN A COHORT STUDY
Not
Injured Injured
Exposed a b a/b = ad
Not Exposed c d o F-e
In a case-control study comparing injured subjects to "controls" without the in-jury, the odds ratio is the ratio of the odds that the injured subjects suffered
exposure to the odds that the controls suffered exposure.
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ket." 7 Plaintiff experts, on the other hand, have devoted sub-
stantial attention to structure-activity, in vitro, and animal
studies, as well as to reanalyses of epidemiological data." 8
2. Problems with Non-Epidemiological Evidence
Structure-activity, in vitro, and animal studies each pose
substantial validity questions. Most problematic, perhaps, is
the structure-activity evidence. Although research exists link-
ing antihistamines to teratogenic injuries, several factors under-
mine its validity." 9 First, even minor changes in molecular
structure can alter a substance's effect.120 The metabolic pro-
cess stands as an unknown intervening variable between the
original chemical structure and the adverse effect. Thus, struc-
ture-activity data presents a problem of internal validity.
In vitro evidence is superior to structure-activity evidence
because it does investigate the effect of the Bendectin ingredi-
ents. In vitro evidence suffers, however, from the same internal
validity problem confronting structure-activity data because the
relevant chemical compound does not go through the metabolic
process before affecting the culture.121 Moreover, the con-
founding of constructs and levels of constructs threatens this
type of evidence. For example, the study which found that
Bendectin inhibited cell differentiation employed a unit of mea-
sure called the teratogenic potential. 22 The authors observed




History of Exposure a b a/c = ad
No History of Exposure c d R -
For example, if one conducted a case-control study with the following results
a=60, b=40, c=40, d=60, the odds ratio would be (60*60)/(40*40) = 3600/1600 =
2.75. See HAROLD KAHN, AN INTRODUCTION TO EPIDEMIOLOGIC METHODS 38-45
(1983).
117. Robert L. Brent, Bendectin and Interventricular Septal Defects, 32 TER-
ATOLOGY 317, 317 (1985); see D.W.G. Harron et al., Debendox and Congenital
Malformations in Northern Ireland, 281 BRrr. MED. J. 1379, 1381 (1980).
118. Sanders, From Science to Evidence, supra note 25, at 43-44.
119. C.T.G. King et al., Antihistamines and Teratogenicity in the Rat, 147 J.
PHARMACOLOGY & ExPERmMENTAL THERAPEUTICS 391, 395 (1965).
120. Green, supra note 57, at 658.
121. O.P. Flint, An In Vitro Test for Teratogens Using Cultures of Rat Em-
bryo Cells, reprinted in IN VITRo METHODS IN TOXICOLOGY 339, 354 (C.Y. At-
terwill & C.E. Steele eds. 1987).
122. Hassell & Horigan, supra note 105, at 327, 330.
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an effect for Bendectin at a dose of .05 mg/ml. 123 Caffeine pro-
duces a similar effect at 2.3mg/ml and vitamin A does so at
.000013 mg/ml.124 It is difficult to translate such dosages in in
vitro studies to the doses humans actually experience.
Because animal studies require ingestion of a drug, they do
not confront all of the threats to internal validity that structure-
activity and in vitro studies face. They do, however, confront ex-
ternal validity threats. Some of the threats result inevitably
from reasonable tradeoffs designed to avoid threats to internal
validity. Among these tradeoffs, dose rates pose the most impor-
tant problem. Researchers usually give animals a substance at
a dose rate much higher than humans would ingest.125 Several
compelling reasons merit this practice. Animal research is ex-
pensive and time consuming. Many substances that are sus-
pected of causing harm do so in only in a small percentage of
organisms exposed at a rate similar to that found in the environ-
ment.126 Subjecting the animals to dose rates no greater than
typical environmental rates would require a very large N to
avoid a high probability of a Type II error. Thus, in order to
guard against threats to statistical conclusion validity, research-
ers increase the dose so that a larger percentage of animals will
react adversely. 127 This closage, however, creates a significant
threat to external validity. The high doses create the potential
for construct validity problems similar to those presented in in
vitro tests: confounding constructs with levels of constructs. At
sufficiently high dose levels almost all substances are terato-
genic.' 28 Moreover, in the case of suspected teratogens, very
high animal dose rates begin to poison the mother and cause
fetal injuries as the byproduct of maternal toxicity and not the
substance's teratogenic effect.129
123. Id. at 330.
124. Id. The authors do not express an opinion about whether Bendectin is
dangerous to humans when taken in normal therapeutic doses. Id. at 330-31.
125. Michael D. Hogan & David G. Hoel, Extrapolation to Man, reprinted in
PRINCIPLES & METHODS OF TOXICOLOGY 879, 879-80 (Wallace Hayes ed., 2d ed.
1989).
126. Jack L. Landan & W. Hugh O'Riordan, Of Mice and Men: The Admissi-
bility of Animal Studies to Prove Causation in Toxic Tort Litigation, 25 IDAHO L.
REV. 521, 537 (1988-89).
127. Even with high dose rates, the relatively small number of animals in
some experiments may create a threat to statistical conclusion validity when
searching for a weak causal link.
128. Thomas H. Shepard, Human Teratogenicity, 33 ADVANCES IN PEDIAT-
Rics 225, 227 (1986).
129. See Tyl et al., supra note 72, at 549.
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Even at more modest dose rates, extrapolation difficulties
pose significant threats to external validity. Assuming a posi-
tive result in an animal study, toxicologists must then extrapo-
late a predicted effect at a dose level humans actually
experience. No single agreed upon model for this extrapolation
exists and competing models produce different predictions.130
Nor is dose rate the only necessary adjustment. There must also
be an adjustment for the fact that species are of different sizes
and mature and age at different rates. Again, there is no agreed
upon formula for this adjustment, and different scaling factors
lead to different estimates of human effects. 131
One reason toxicologists tolerate the threat to external va-
lidity posed by high dose rates is that most animal studies are
designed to be part of the regulatory process rather than part of
proof of causation in litigation. When testing a new drug the
critical question is whether a teratogenic effect might arise in
humans even though it is not observed in animals. The crucial
error to avoid is a Type II error. When litigants take these stud-
ies to the courtroom, however, the central question becomes
whether a known effect in a test animal is probative of whether
a human effect exists at a much lower dose rate. Although it is
quite rare for a known human teratogen to fail to cause birth
defects in at least some animals, 13 2 it is more likely that a sub-
stance for which there is no evidence of human teratogenicity
will produce an effect in some animal species.1 33
130. For example, varying statistical models for extrapolating carcinogenic
effects produce different results when the laboratory dose rate is substantially
greater than the environmental dose rate. OSHA Generic Cancer Policy, 45
Fed. Reg. 5002, 5184-85 (1980); David S. Salsburg, Statistics and Toxicology:
An Overview, in ScmNTrFc CONSIDERATIONS IN MONITORING AND EVALUATING
ToxicOLOGIcAL RESEARCH 123, 130-31 (Edward Gralla ed., 1981).
131. See James P. Leape, Quantitative Risk Assessment in Regulation of En-
vironmental Carcinogens, 4 HARv. ENvT'. L. REV. 86, 98-99 (1980). Compari-
sons of risk estimates of cancer based on extrapolations from animal data with
actual human epidemiological data indicate that only half the substances ex-
amined yielded accurate estimates. Landau & O'Riordan, supra note 126, at
548 (indicating that many estimates err by factors of 10 or more).
132. LAN C.T. NISBET & NATHAN J. KARCH, CHEMICAL HAZARDS TO HUMAN
REPRODUCTION 98-99 (1983).
133. A 1980 FDA study reported that of 165 compounds with no reported
human teratologic effects, only 28% appeared negative in all animal species
tested. 45 Fed. Reg. 69,816, 69,823 (1980); NISBET & KARcH, supra note 132, at
105. For explanations of how and why effects in humans differ from various
animal species, see EDwARD J. CALABRESE, PRINCIPLES OF ANIMAL ExTRAPoLA-
TION 237-38 (1983); Gary P. Carlson, Factors Modifying Toxicity, in Toxic SUB-
STANCES AND HUMAN RIsK: PRINCIPLES OF DATA INTERPRETATION 47, 49 (R.
Tardiff & J. Rdricks eds., 1987). One example is reported in Turpin v. Merrell
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3. Court Attitudes Towards Non-Epidemiological Data
The validity threats facing non-epidemiological data have
caused several courts to refuse to allow Bendectin plaintiffs to
introduce this type of evidence or prevail thereon. 34 Courts
have reached this conclusion by a number of different paths.
One group has directed verdicts or ordered summary judgment
for the defendant without ruling on the admissibility of the
plaintiffs non-epidemiology experts. 35 These are properly
characterized as sufficiency rulings; the court concludes that the
plaintiff cannot survive a directed verdict or a summary judg-
ment motion because the causal proof cannot sustain a verdict
for the plaintiff. For example, in Brock v. Merrell Dow, the Fifth
Circuit held that the plaintiff could not prevail without epidemi-
ological evidence of a statistically significant relationship be-
tween Bendectin and the plaintiffs limb reduction defect.' 3 6
Because the opinion followed a jury trial, the Fifth Circuit did
not need to rule on the admissibility of the plaintiffs non-epide-
miological evidence.137 In Turpin v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuti-
cals, Inc.,1 8 however, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the trial court's
grant of summary judgment for the defendant and held that the
plaintiffs proffered testimony was insufficient to sustain a
verdict.139
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 959 F.2d 1349, 1359 n.4 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. de-
nied, 113 S. Ct. 84 (1992). Several animal studies have found that cortisone
causes severe cleft palate birth defects in several animal species, but not in
humans. Alfred M. Bongiovanni & Arthur J. McPadden, Steroids During Preg-
nancy and Possible Fetal Consequences, 11 FERTLIY & STEmLTY 181, 184-85
(1960). It may be, of course, that some chemicals with no apparent carcinogenic
or teratogenic effect are not in fact completely harmless because of significant
limits on the ability of epidemiological studies to detect small risks.
134. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 727 F. Supp. 570,
575 (S.D. Cal. 1989), affd, 951 F.2d 1128 (9th Cir. 1991), vacated, 113 S. Ct.
2786 (1993).
135. See, e.g., Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 874 F.2d 307,
311-13 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1046 (1990).
136. Id. at 313.
137. Id. at 313-15; see Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Havner, No. 13-
92-540-CV, 1994 WL 86436 (Tex. Ct. App. March 17, 1994)
138. 959 F.2d 1349 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 84 (1992).
139. Id. at 1360-61. The court refused to conclude that animal studies could
never form the basis of an opinion that a substance is a human teratogen, only
that the plaintiffs animal studies could not. Id. at 1360. The Turpin district
court excluded much of the plaintiffs evidence under Rule 703 but held in the
alternative that, even if admissible as a matter of law, the evidence could not
support a verdict for the plaintiff. Turpin v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., 736 F. Supp. 737, 744 (E.D. Ky. 1990); see also Elkins v. Richardson-Mer-
rell, Inc., 8 F.3d 1068 (6th Cir. 1993) (affirming grant of summary judgement
for defendant by relying on Turpin), cert. denied, 62 USLW 3618 (1994).
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Another group of courts simply holds that non-epidemiologi-
cal evidence is inadmissible. 140 Some, such as the Ninth Circuit
in Daubert, reach this result under the Frye test.141 More rele-
vant in the post-Frye environment, however, are those cases
which excluded the plaintiff's testimony under Federal Rule 702
or 703.142 In Lynch v. Merrell-National Laboratories,143 one of
the earliest opinions to take this position, the trial court entered
summary judgment for the defendant after concluding that tes-
timony on human teratogenicity based on structure-activity, in
vitro, or animal studies was not of the "type reasonably relied
upon by experts in the particular field" and therefore inadmissi-
ble.' 44 A similar analysis can be found in Richardson v. Rich-
ardson-Merrell, Inc.:
140. See, e.g., Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 857 F.2d 823 (D.C.
Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 882 (1989).
141. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 951 F.2d 1128 (9th Cir.
1991), vacated, 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
142. An important non-Bendectin case with a similar ruling is In re "Agent
Orange" Products Liability Litigation. 611 F. Supp. 1223 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), a'ffd,
818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1234 (1988). There, Judge
Weinstein refused to allow the plaintiffs experts to base their opinion on
animal studies, primarily because of external validity concerns:
The many studies on animal exposure to Agent Orange, even plaintiffs'
expert concedes, are not persuasive in this lawsuit .... There is no
evidence that plaintiffs were exposed to the far higher concentrations
involved in both the animal and industrial exposure studies. Cf In re
"Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 597 F. Supp. 740, 782
(E.D.N.Y.1984). The animal studies are not helpful in the instant case
because they involve different biological species. They are of so little
probative force and are so potentially misleading as to be inadmissible.
See FED. R. EvID. 401-403. They cannot be an acceptable predicate for
an opinion under Rule 703.
In re "Agent Orange", 611 F.Supp. at 1241; see In re Paoli Railroad Yard PCB
Litigation, Nos. 86-2229, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16287, at *15 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 21,
1992) (holding that animal studies are of limited reliability when attempting to
apply their results to humans).
143. 646 F. Supp. 856 (D. Mass. 1986), affd, 830 F.2d 1190 (1st Cir. 1987).
144. Id. at 866-67. The court noted the following:
None of the animal studies submitted by the plaintiffs provide evi-
dence of teratogenicity at doses comparable to the human therapeutic
dose of Bendectin. These animal studies are therefore lacking in pro-
bative value and must be found inadmissible.... For similar reasons,
this Court must reject the plaintiffs' proffered evidence of in vitro stud-
ies and studies of analogous chemical structures as a basis for the
plaintiffs' experts testimony.... This Court also cannot find, pursuant
to Rule 703, that such studies are "of a type reasonably relied upon by
experts in the particular field." Dr. John Hassell, the author of one
such in vitro study, has expressly recognized that neither his technique
nor any other in vitro system has yet been validated as an accurate
predictor of teratogenicity in animals or humans.... Thus, a careful
review of the material before this Court indicates that the only rele-
vant, probative, and non-misleading evidence on the issue of Bendec-
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These three types of studies then-chemical, in vitro, and in vivo-
cannot furnish a sufficient foundation for a conclusion that Bendectin
caused the birth defects at issue in this case. Studies of this kind, sin-
gly or in combination, are not capable of proving causation in human
beings in the face of the overwhelming body of contradictory epidemio-
logical evidence.
14 5
The key to Richardson is its comparative analysis. The court
essentially held that structure-activity, in vitro and animal
studies cannot form a sufficient foundation when substantial ep-
idemiological evidence exists.1 46 Similar language can be found
in the district court opinions in Lee v. Richardson-Merrell,
Inc.,147 and Turpin v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,148
both of which excluded non-epidemiological evidence.
Whether such non-epidemiological evidence should be ex-
cluded under a scientific validity standard turns on how pre-
cisely one poses the issue. If one asks whether, standing alone,
structure-activity, in vitro and animal studies should be ex-
cluded, the answer depends on which type of evidence is under
consideration. Inevitably, validity is a matter of degree. All
types of non-epidemiological evidence suffer from some external
validity problems when used to address whether Bendectin is a
human teratogen at normal dose levels. The animal studies
data, however, confronts far fewer problems and have some
strengths vis-a-vis epidemiological studies. If the only evidence
tin's role in the causation of birth defects are the controlled
observations of human beings, documented in more than 25 published
epidemiological studies.
Id.
145. 857 F.2d 823 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
146. In situations where there is not a substantial body of epidemiological
data, however, courts have been more accepting of animal study data. See, e.g.,
Marder v. G.D. Searle & Co., 630 F. Supp. 1087, 1094 (D. Md. 1986), affd sub
noma., Wheelahan v. G.D. Searle & Co., 814 F.2d 655 (4th Cir. 1987).
147. 772 F. Supp. 1027, 1029-33 (W.D. Tenn. 1991), affd, 961 F.2d 1577 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 197 (1992).
148. 736 F. Supp. 737, 739-44 (E.D. Ky. 1990). The courts in Lee and Turpin
employed a test developed in United States v. Green, 548 F.2d 1261 (6th Cir.
1977) and United States v. Kozminski, 821 F.2d 1186 (6th Cir. 1987), affd, 487
U.S. 931 (1988). The Green court set forth a four-prong test for admissibility:
(1) a qualified expert must be offered; (2) the expert must testify on a proper
subject; (3) the expert must testify in conformity with a generally accepted ex-
planatory theory; and (4) the probative value of the testimony must outweigh
any prejudicial effect. Green, 548 F.2d at 1268. Kozminski further refined the
third element by requiring that the explanatory theory must have: (a) received
at least some exposure within the scientific peerage to which it belongs; (b) been
subjected to peer evaluation to determine its scientific validity and reliability;
and (c) achieved general acceptance within the scientific community to which it
belongs. Kozminski, 821 F.2d at 1201.
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available to a "first plaintiff"149 expert is an animal study indi-
cating a teratogenic effect on mice exposed to Bendectin at a
dose rate one order of magnitude greater than a human dose, it
is difficult to see why this should not be admissible. The ques-
tion becomes more difficult when the only evidence is an in vitro
study indicating DNA damage to cells exposed to Bendectin. In
an extreme case, where the only available evidence is a struc-
ture-activity study relating some antihistamines to birth de-
fects, the threats to internal and external validity may indeed be
so large that the evidence cannot form the basis of an expert
opinion that Bendectin is a teratogen. Thus, judging each type
of evidence on its own, a court might reasonably exclude an ex-
pert's conclusion that Bendectin is a teratogen if it is based
solely on structure-activity evidence, but might admit an opin-
ion based on animal studies.
The courts that have excluded non-epidemiological data in
the Bendectin cases have not approached the problem in this
way. They have not independently assessed the admissibility of
each type of evidence as if it were the only available evidence
and they been hesitant to conclude that plaintiffs can never
reach a jury without epidemiological evidence. Instead, they
have carved out an exception for Bendectin cases because of the
rich epidemiological data available.150 Whether the admissibil-
149. A "first plaintiff' is the first individual to claim that a toxic substance
causes injury. This individual must frequently litigate on an undeveloped sci-
entific record. See Sanders, The Bendectin Litigation, supra note 24, at 349.
150. See Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 857 F.2d 823 (D.C. Cir.
1988). At least two courts have refused to adopt this unique approach in
Bendectin cases. In Longmore v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the court
concluded as follows:
Animal studies are generally relied upon by experts determining the
link between a drug and birth defects and the same is true for chemical
analysis. While the Court will leave open the question of the admissi-
bility of particular studies during the trial of this matter, the Court
cannot now preclude all such studies under Rule 703.
737 F. Supp. 1117, 1121 (D. Idaho 1990). In In Re Bendectin Products Liability
Litigation, Judge Rubin, the trial judge who presided over the 1985 Multidis-
trict Litigation Bendectin Trial in Ohio, also refused to hold non-epidemiologi-
cal evidence inadmissible under Rule 703, noting the following:
The division in the scientific community over whether epidemiological
studies should be relied upon exclusively necessitates the inescapable
conclusion that experts may reasonably rely upon other types of data
when forming an opinion as to the teratogenicity of Bendectin. A con-
trary finding is unjustifiable without a pronouncement in this circuit
that, as a matter of law, epidemiological studies are the sole basis upon
which an expert may reasonably rely when forming an opinion on a
drug's teratogenicity.
732 F. Supp. 744, 749 (E.D. Mich. 1990) (citations omitted).
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ity of one type of evidence should vary depending on the exist-
ence of other evidence poses an interesting, but different,
question. More precisely, should the admissibility of non-epide-
miological evidence turn on the existence of epidemiological evi-
dence? Applying a validity analysis under Rule 702, the answer
is no. Under that standard, if the threats to internal and exter-
nal validity do not render a piece of evidence unreliable, that
evidence does not become unreliable simply because better data
is available.
The Bendectin courts, however, have not relied on Rule 702
as the basis of their opinions. Rather, most have found the evi-
dence inadmissible under Rule 703 and held that non-epidemio-
logical findings are not the type of evidence relied upon by
experts in the field.151 The propriety of this approach depends
on the structure of the plaintiffs entire case. An everyday ex-
ample illustrates this point. When the only evidence whether a
dog walked across the front lawn last night is the report of three
eyewitnesses who say they saw no dog, this constitutes the best
evidence available and is admissible. When, on the other hand,
it snowed during the night, the presence of dog tracks across the
lawn greatly diminishes the value of the eyewitness testimony.
Similarly, when animal studies supply the only available evi-
dence that a substance causes harm, teratology experts may rea-
sonably rely on this finding. When a large and rich body of
epidemiological data exists, however, experts may cease to rely
on the animal study as the primary basis of their opinion about
whether the substance is a teratogen. Nevertheless, an in-
dependent Rule 702 validity analysis indicates why courts
should refuse to conclude that non-epidemiological evidence is
inadmissible even when a large body of epidemiological data
exists.
One could argue, under Rule 703, that it would be inappro-
priate to form one's opinion about whether Bendectin is a ter-
atogen based entirely on non-epidemiological evidence.
Something like a "best scientific evidence" rule might render an
opinion based solely on such evidence inadmissible. 152 This does
not mean, however, that the best alternative is to base an opin-
ion solely on the epidemiological evidence. On the contrary,
from a scientific validity perspective it would be preferable to
151. See, e.g., Richardson, 857 F.2d at 829-32.
152. See Green, supra note 57, at 676 (noting that the probity of toxicology
evidence, especially animal studies, varies inversely with the quality of the epi-
demiological evidence).
1416
1994] SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE SYMPOSIUM
form one's opinion about Bendectin based on all of the available
evidence: epidemiological, animal studies, in vitro and perhaps
even structure-activity. This conclusion focuses on questions of
construct validity. Any single operation-any single study-is
threatened by a potential mono-operation bias. 153 Cook and
Campbell note: "Since single operations both under represent
constructs and contain irrelevancies, construct validity will be
lower in single exemplar research than in research where each
construct is multiple operationalized in order to triangulate on
the referent."154 Thus, confounders or other irrelevancies, may
affect the results of a single epidemiological study. Multiple
studies provide greater certainty that the observed relationships
does in fact represent the concepts under investigation.
Even multiple epidemiological replications suffer from
mono-method bias. "[WIhen all the manipulations are presented
in the same way, or all the measures use the same means of
recording responses, then the method is itself an irrelevancy
whose influence cannot be dissociated from the influence of the
target construct."' 55 As a method, epidemiology has many
strengths, but it also has weaknesses. Because it is not an ex-
perimental method, it inevitably suffers from some internal va-
lidity problems. On the other hand, because animal studies are
experiments, it is relatively more certain that the substance ex-
perimentally manipulated caused any observed effect. Each
type of evidence addresses some of the weaknesses of the other.
The whole is greater than the sum of the parts.
Bendectin plaintiffs have never argued that epidemiological
data should be disregarded. On the contrary, plaintiff experts
who are prepared to testify that more likely than not Bendectin
caused the plaintiffs birth defect, have based their conclusion on
all available evidence, including animal studies and epidemio-
logical research. 156 Excluding non-epidemiological evidence be-
cause better, epidemiological evidence exists is erroneous under
a scientific validity standard. Within the context of a scientific
validity discussion, the admissibility of such evidence is not con-
tingent upon the existence of other, arguably better evidence.
Likewise, exclusion under Rule 703 conflicts with common scien-
tific understandings of construct validity and mono-method bias.
153. CooK & CAMPBELL, supra note 56, at 65.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 66.
156. See, e.g., Oxendine v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 506 A.2d
1100, 1104-08 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
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B. THE EXCLUSION OF THE REAALYsIs OF EPIDEMIOLOGICAL
STUDIES
Plaintiff efforts to produce a prima facie case of causation
have never depended entirely on non-epidemiological evidence.
Throughout, Bendectin plaintiffs have offered epidemiological
evidence in the form of a reanalysis of existing epidemiological
studies. 157 Epidemiological studies have typically escaped the
criticism that they are so invalid as to be inadmissible. Never-
theless, plaintiff experts usually design the reanalyses to correct
for alleged threats to the validity of results reported in pub-
lished epidemiological research. 158  They have focused on
threats to statistical conclusion validity, primarily stemming
from unreliable measurement and the relatively small Ns of
many studies. 59 The most serious measurement threat derives
from the fact that many of the studies were unable to determine
exactly when the expectant mothers took Bendectin. For exam-
ple, limb reduction defects occur when the limbs are first form-
ing, a period that lasts approximately two weeks. 160 If
researchers included women who took Bendectin after this pe-
riod among the exposed group, the study will underestimate any
effect. 161 The effect of changes in defining exposure can be dra-
matic.162 The existence of doxylamine succinate in products
such as Unisom adds another potential source of bias. 163 Unless
researchers ask women whether they took such products during
pregnancy, they may code certain women as unexposed who in
fact ingested Bendectin's most suspect ingredient. As in the
case of misclassification due to time of ingestion, coding errors
will underestimate any effect.
157. See Testimony of Dr. Shanna Helen Swan, morning session, Sept. 19,
1991, at 43-64, Havner v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., No. 88-3915-F
(Tex. Dist. Ct., 214th Jud. Dist., March 17, 1994) (on file with the author).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Green, supra note 57, at 650.
161. When it is unknown whether the mother ingested the drug during or-
ganogenesis, the study will mistakenly categorize women who took the drug too
late in their pregnancy for it to cause a defect as women exposed to Bendectin.
These women should be counted as "controls," women not exposed to the drug.
The precise consequences of this misclassification are difficult to assess. For
"negative cases'"-women whose children do not have defects-the misclassifi-
cation underestimates the drug's teratogenic. For "positive cases," however, the
misclassification overestimates the teratogenic effect. Overall, such misclassifi-
cation introduces an error term that will attenuate any effect that does exist.
See Green, supra note 57, at 650 n.32.
162. See id. at 650.
163. PHYsIcIAN's DESK REFERENCE 2642 (1994).
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In addition, because limb reduction defects, which underlie
many Bendectin claims, are rare events, the number of individu-
als who suffer from a given defect and whose mothers took
Bendectin is relatively small. As a consequence, there is a sub-
stantial risk of making a Type H error due to low statistical
power. For example, five cohort studies which report limb re-
duction injuries together contain only eleven such cases. 164 One
way to increase statistical power is to conduct case-control stud-
ies that purposefully pick as cases individuals who exhibit the
injury under investigation.165 Four published case-control stud-
ies include limb reduction defects with a total N of 312 cases, 61
of whom had mothers who were exposed to the drug.166 Only
two of the studies had Ns sufficiently large to afford a 50%
chance of detecting a relative risk of two or smaller. 167 In fact,
except for one case-control study,168 the total data on limb re-
duction defects is quite limited.' 69
164. See Jon Powell, How to Tell the Truth With Statistics: A New Statisti-
cal Approach to Analyzing the Bendectin Epidemiological Data in the Aftermath
of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 31 Hous. L. REv. (forthcoming
1994) (manuscript at 58, of file with author). These studies together have an N
of nearly 97,000 and yet they contain only 113 total limb reduction defects. Id.
165. In contingency table analyses typical of epidemiological research, the
frequency of exposure in the population (the percentage of pregnant women us-
ing Bendectin) and the incidence of the effect (the frequency of limb reductions)
both affect the study's power. See generally JAMEs J. SCHLESSELMAN, CASE-
CONTROL STUnms: DESIGN, CONDUCT, ANALYSIS (1982). In cohort studies the
frequency of an effect in any given study sample approximates the frequency in
the population from which the sample was drawn. When the effect is very rare
one needs very large samples to avoid Type II errors. In case-control studies
the incidence of the effect is set at an artificially high level because researchers
purposefully pick cases that exhibit the injury. Thus, when the incidence of an
effect is rare in the population, case-control studies are much more powerful
than cohort studies. See CARL F. CRAYNOR, REGULATING Toxic SUBSTANCES: A
PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE AND THE LAw 36 (1993); KAHN, supra note 116, at 54.
166. See Powell, supra note 164, at 58.
167. Id. at 61. This assumes an Alpha of.05 and a two tailed test of signifi-
cance. Id.
168. Janet McCredie et al., The Innocent Bystander: Doxylamine/Di-
cyclomine, Pyridoxine and Congenital Limb Defects, 140 MED. J. AUsTL. 525
(1984).
169. Pooling and meta analysis combine data from several studies, produc-
ing a larger N and, ceteris paribus, greater statistical power. See generally Ei-
narson et al., supra note 63 (presenting a step-by-step method for conducting a
meta-analysis of epidemiological data); Wolf, supra note 63 (basic text on meta-
analysis). Even these techniques cannot completely rule out the possibility that
Bendectin is a weak teratogen. Powell performed meta analyses on studies
with limb reduction data. See Powell, supra note 164. In a meta analysis of
case-control studies, the Odds Ratio was 1.1, with a Chi Square of .2, p. < .65,
and a 95% confidence interval of 0.56-2.17. A meta analysis of cohort studies
generated an Odds Ratio of .89, with a Chi Square of .03, p. < .86 and a 95%
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Plaintiff experts Shanna Swan and Alan Done have criti-
cized the published studies for all of these reasons and chal-
lenged the statistical conclusion validity of their results.' 70
They have also recoded and reanalyzed the data in some studies.
Are such reanalyses so invalid that they should be excluded
under Rule 702? The proffered testimony of Dr. Swan and Dr.
Done supply two examples of plaintiff efforts to reanalyze the
epidemiological evidence and provide a framework for address-
ing this question.
1. The Testimony of Dr. Swan
The first example involves Dr. Shanna Swan's reanalysis of
the Center for Disease Control epidemiological data published
by Cordero. 17  A fundamental threat to the internal validity of
epidemiological research is recall bias.'7 2 Mothers bearing chil-
dren with a birth defect may sift through their pre-natal experi-
ence in search of an explanation for the injury. As a
consequence, in case-control studies employing a control group
of healthy babies, the case mothers will remember more drug
exposures which produces a biased result. Researchers can try
to alleviate this threat in several ways. One alternative is to
examine the prescription records of the mother's physician. Epi-
demiologists at the Center for Disease Control employed another
confidence interval of 0.20-4.02. A meta analysis combining all studies gener-
ated an Odds Ratio of 1.05, with a Chi Square of .06, p. < .81, and a 95% confi-
dence interval of 0.42-2.62. Id. at 78. Plaintiff experts have criticized these
techniques, in part because they may treat all included studies as if they were
of equal quality. See Testimony of Dr. Shanna Helen Swan, morning session,
Sept. 19, 1991, at 39ff, Havner v. Merrell-Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., No. 88-
3915-F (Tex. Dist. Ct., 214th Jud. Dist., March 17, 1994) (on file with the
author).
The limited number of limb defects in the epidemiological literature raises
the issue of whether the relationship between Bendectin use and other types of
defects is relevant to the question of whether Bendectin causes limb reduction
defects. This, of course, is a question of external validity. Bendectin plaintiffs
and defendants have, from time to time, been on both sides of this issue. See
Sanders, From Science to Evidence, supra note 25, at 26.
170. See, e.g., Testimony of Dr. Shanna Helen Swan, morning session, Sept.
19, 1991 at 1-81, Havner v. Merrell-Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., No. 88-3915-F
(Tex. Dist. Ct., 214th Jud. Dist., March 17, 1994) (on file with the author).
171. Cordero et al., supra note 114, at 2307.
172. Recall bias is just one of many potential sources of bias that threaten
the internal validity of epidemiological studies. Other important sources of bias
are: publication bias-only studies that uncover significant results are pub-
lished; and the existence of confounders that interact with the drug in question
to produce injury. See Green, supra note 57, at 649-51; David L. Sackett, Bias
in Analytic Research, 32 J. CHRONIC DIsEASEs 51, 51 (1979).
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particularly innovative method in analyzing data from the Met-
ropolitan Atlanta Congenital Defects Program. 173 The investi-
gators divided the data into categories of birth defects and then
examined the rate of first-trimester Bendectin exposure for each
defect.' 74 They compared these "cases" to a control group com-
posed of infants with birth defects other than the one being eval-
uated.'7 5 Because all children in the study, both cases and
controls, suffered from some birth defect, the study minimized
recall bias.'7 6 As the authors noted, this technique would not
allow them to detect an effect if a substance under investigation
uniformly increased the risk of all types of defects investi-
gated.' 7 7 The authors discounted this possibility, however, not-
ing that known human and animal teratogens cause specific
birth defects or patterns of defects.' 78
Dr. Swan argued that, if Bendectin causes more than one
kind of birth defect, this technique would underestimate its ter-
atogenic effects because Bendectin exposure would cause some
of the control group defects and the resulting analysis would un-
derestimate the drug's effect.'7 9 Dr. Swan re-read interview
forms from the study and corrected what she perceived to be cod-
ing errors in drug use or date of exposure.' 80 Then, in order to
avoid a control group of children with defects potentially caused
by Bendectin exposure, she chose as a control only those chil-
dren afflicted with Down's Syndrome and other known genetic
disorders.' 8 ' Dr. Swan reasoned that, because researchers
know that drug exposure does not cause these injuries, diagnos-
tic bias would not attenuate the results. 182 Using this new con-
trol group, her reanalysis produced a significant correlation
between Bendectin and limb reduction defects.' 8 3
Measured by a validity standard, Dr. Swan's use of a differ-
ent control group seems reasonable. It attempted to achieve
some of what the CDC investigators hoped to achieve by using a
control group comprised of children with defects while also con-
trolling for a separate threat to internal validity arising from the
173. Cordero et al., supra note 114, at 2307-09.
174. Id. at 2307.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 2310.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Lynch v. Merrell-Nat'l Lab., Inc., 830 F.2d 1190, 1194 (1st Cir. 1987).





MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78:1387
"misdiagnosis" of the control group. There is, however, an addi-
tional factor to consider. As the First Circuit observed in Lynch
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the Odds Ratio between
Bendectin exposure and Down's Syndrome in the Atlanta sam-
ple was 0.57-children suffering from Down's Syndrome were
less likely to have been exposed to Bendectin than children suf-
fering from other defects.184 Cordero's study prominently re-
ported this result and Dr. Swan must have known this when she
chose to use children with genetic defects as the control group.
A comparison between the Down's Syndrome children and chil-
dren with most other defects will produce an Odds Ratio sub-
stantially in excess of 1.0.185 The First Circuit referred to this
when it dismissed Swan's analysis:
As far as appears from what is in the record, Swan made no allowance
for the possibility that the very fact of having such a severe genetic
deficiency as Down's Syndrome might operate to make other rare defi-
ciencies such as limb reduction less likely to occur in the control group
- that is, that the combination of Down's syndrome and another major
misfortune might be extremely unusual. Without accounting for this
possible skewing of the control group, Swan's basis for her comparative
conclusion is not apparent.
186
The court provided no authority to support its assertion and the
Cordero Study's data supplies no evidence for this proposition.
The study does not imply that Down's Syndrome is a prophylac-
tic against other types of defects; that conclusion would require
a comparison of Down's Syndrome children and all other chil-
dren for the existence of an additional defect. Absent some au-
thority that Down's Syndrome has this effect, the court's
assertion is little more than unsubstantiated hypothesis, hardly
the type of validity threat that merited rejecting Dr. Swan's
testimony.
This does not mean that Dr. Swan's analysis is preferable to
that of Cordero and his colleagues. In fact, there are at least
three reasons why their analysis is superior. First, Dr. Swan's
analysis creates a greater likelihood of recall bias. Because the
parents of a Down's Syndrome child know that the defect has
184. Id. at 1195. The study coded approximately 6% (10 of 166) of the
Down's Syndrome children as exposed to Bendectin. In the entire sample, ap-
proximately 9.5% (117 of 1,231) of the children were exposed. Cordero et al.,
supra note 114, at 2308, tbl. 2.
185. The Cordero study reported a 1.18 Odds Ratio for limb reductions. Id.
Using only the data reported in the study and, using the Downs Syndrome chil-
dren as the controls, the Odds Ratio for limb reductions is approximately 2.3
(14*156)/(10*115). See id.
186. Lynch, 830 F.2d at 1195.
1422
19941 SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE SYMPOSIUM
genetic origins, they are less likely to search through their pre-
natal experience for possible chemical causes of the injury. In
addition, the incidence of morning sickness among mothers car-
rying children with Down's Syndrome is unknown. If the inci-
dence is lower than other mothers experienced, Down's
Syndrome mothers would presumably be less likely to take any
morning sickness medication which would make Down's Syn-
drome children an inappropriate control. Finally, the control
group was inappropriate because Dr. Swan knew the result she
would obtain before she conducted her reanalysis. Because Dr.
Swan knew before she began that her comparison would produce
a positive correlation between Bendectin use and limb reduction
defects, the analysis could not test this hypothesis; it could not
produce a negative answer. The possibility of a Type II error
was zero and the possibility of a Type I error was essentially
unknowable. Perhaps this lies at the heart of the First Circuit's
rejection of her analysis. Although it is particularly troublesome
when an investigator preparing an analysis for litigation knows
a priori that the results will support the client's position, it does
not necessarily follow that a court should exclude such testi-
mony. The problem with Dr. Swan's testimony arose because
she completed the reanalysis for the purposes of litigation; she
was not testing a research hypothesis. To exclude her testimony
on this ground, however, would condemn many, if not most re-
analyses of existing data by experts hired for litigation.
2. The Testimony of Dr. Done
The second example is Dr. Done's proffered testimony in
DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. '8 7 When the case
first appeared before him, Judge Brown entered summary judg-
ment for the defendant.' 88 He first affirmed a Magistrate's or-
der excluding all in vitro and in vivo studies.' 8 9 He then held
that the plaintiffs expert testimony on epidemiology was inad-
missible because it lacked the requisite Rule 703 foundation. 90
187. 131 F.R.D. 71 (D. N.J. 1989), rev'd, 911 F.2d 941 (3d Cir. 1990), on re-
mand, 791 F. Supp. 1042 (D. N.J. 1992), affd, 6 F.3d 778 (3d Cir. 1993), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 691 (1994).
188. Id. at 74.
189. See DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 791 F. Supp. 1042,
1045 (D. N.J. 1992), affd, 6 F.3d 778 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 691
(1994). The plaintiff did not challenge this portion of the ruling. Id. at 1045,
1047 n.8.
190. DeLuca, 131 F.R.D. at 74.
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The Third Circuit reversed, first noting that the primary
difference between Dr. Done and the opposing epidemiologists
was that Dr. Done subscribed to tle approach advocated by Pro-
fessor Kenneth Rothman,' 9 ' which deemphasizes traditional
significance testing in favor of reporting relative risks and confi-
dence intervals surrounding estimates of relative risk.192 The
court held that without a record-supported, factual finding that
the data Dr. Done used was not of the type reasonably relied
upon by experts in epidemiology, Rule 703 did not bar his testi-
mony. 193 Because Dr. Done used data from the same published
epidemiological studies the defense relied on, the court ex-
pressed serious doubts that such a finding would be possible 194
Turning to Rule 702, the court noted that the admissibility of
Dr. Done's analysis was susceptible of judicial notice to the ex-
tent he based it on traditional epidemiological methodology. 195
Because the existing record was insufficient to make this deci-
sion, the court remanded and invited the trial judge to conduct
hearings and obtain expert assistance in determining whether
the evidence was sufficiently reliable to be admissible.196 Fi-
nally, the Third Circuit specifically refused to decide whether
epidemiological proof is inadmissible unless the data allow one
to reject the null hypothesis at a .05 level of statistical signifi-
cance, leaving the question for the trial court on remand. 197 It
did note, however, that the trial court should not focus solely
upon tests of significance but rather should assess "all the risks
of error posed by the proffered evidence." 198
In many respects the Third Circuit's analysis in DeLuca ex-
hibits the best understanding of validity issues of all the
Bendectin opinions. The court's appreciation for the importance
191. See Kenneth Rothman, Modem Epidemiology (1986); Amicus Curiae
Brief for Kenneth Rothman et al. in Support of Petitioners, Daubert v. Merrell
Dow, 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
192. DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 946-49
(3d. Cir. 1990), on remand, 791 F. Supp. 1042 (D. N.J. 1992), affd, 6 F.3d 778
(3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 691 (1994).
193. Id. at 953.191 Id.
194. Id. at 954.
195. Id. at 955-56.
196. Id. The defendant had urged this position. Id. at 954. The statistical
significance requirement was, of course, at the heart of the Fifth Circuit's opin-
ion in Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 874 F.2d 307, modified, 884
F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1046 (1990). Recall, however,
that Brock employed a sufficiency and not an admissibility analysis. See Brock,
874 F.2d at 311-15.
197. Deluca, 911 F.2d at 955.
198. Id. at 959.
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of both Type I and Type II errors, and its recognition of the exist-
ence of multiple threats to validity stand in sharp contrast to the
analyses in Lynch and Brock. This very understanding, how-
ever, made it difficult for the court to announce any specific ad-
missibility guidelines and it left those issues to the trial
court.
1 9 9
Judge Brown proceeded to hold a five day hearing followed
by extensive post-hearing submissions. 200 The parties offered
written direct testimony and oral cross examination of eight ex-
pert witnesses.201 Based on this record the judge made 120 sep-
arate findings of fact and 41 conclusions of law.20
2
Judge Brown first contrasted the lack of a statistically sig-
nificant relationship between Bendectin ingestion and limb re-
duction defects in the published literature with Dr. Done's
conclusion that reanalysis demonstrated a relationship. 20 3 The
parties did not dispute that Dr. Done's underlying data were of a
type reasonably relied upon by experts in epidemiology.204 They
did dispute, however, the validity of Dr. Done's calculations and
the manner in which he presented his ultimate results, what
Judge Brown characterized as "the methodology employed by
Dr. Done."20 5 Addressing this methodology, Judge Brown noted
occasions in which Dr. Done included data that he arguably
should have omitted,20 6 other occasions where he excluded data
that he should have included,20 7 and still other occasions where
he selectively reported data.208 The judge noted that Dr. Done's
reanalysis did not give greater weight to studies with larger
number of exposed defects, the studies with the greatest
power. 20 9 Dr. Done also failed to weight studies based on their
design or control for other sources of bias. 210 Dr. Done did not
attempt to reach a quantitative conclusion based on his reevalu-
199. DeLuca, 791 F. Supp. at 1044.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 1044-59.
202. Id. at 1059.
203. Id. at 1045-46.
204. Id. at 1047 n.10.
205. Id.
206. Id. Judge Brown then proceeded to examine Dr. Done's calculations
and presentation in considerable detail. He compared Dr. Done's calculations of
relative risks with those of the defense experts and Dr. Shanna Swan, the
plaintiffs other expert witness. On several occasions, he noted that Dr. Swan's
analysis contravened Dr. Done's. Id. at 1047-49.
207. Id. at 1050.
208. Id. at 1051.
209. Id. at 1051.
210. Id. at 1051-52.
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ation of the data, either by way of pooled data or a meta analy-
sis.211 Finally, the Judge noted a number of ways in which Dr.
Done's presentation was misleading.21 2
The judge then proceeded to hold Dr. Done's testimony inad-
missible under both Rules 702 and 703.213 He followed a five
part Rule 702 analysis which considered: the novelty of the
technique; the existence of a specialized literature; the expert's
qualifications; the non-judicial uses to which the scientific tech-
niques are put; and the frequency with which the technique
leads to erroneous results. 2i 4 With respect to each element,
Judge Brown found Dr. Done's testimony to be wanting.215
Although the judge did not discuss scientific validity in making
his 702 ruling, the opinion can be translated into this language.
Statistical Conclusion validity posed the biggest threat to Dr.
Done's findings. The thrust of his analysis was that, although
individual studies fail to produce a statistically significant rela-
tionship between Bendectin and limb reduction defects, an anal-
ysis of all the data together do reveal a relationship.
Unfortunately, Dr. Done selected his 106 "data sets" in a man-
ner that made it difficult to assess the relative likelihood of Type
I and Type II errors. One gets the sense that Dr. Done engaged
in a fishing expedition, sifting through large number of correla-
tions in search of significant relationships. Moreover, the re-
analyses contained measurement errors due to unreliable
coding, incorrect calculations or both.
The judge also held the testimony inadmissible under Rule
703, concluding that experts in the field would not use the data
Dr. Done relied on in rendering an opinion.216 Again, the judge
211. DeLuca, 791 F. Supp. at 1052.
212. Id. at 1053. "Dr. Done's statement that 70% of his data sets have an
upper confidence level above 2.0 is misleading without the corresponding infor-
mation that 94% have lower confidence limits below 2.0 and only 30% of his
data sets have a relative risk greater than 2.0." Id. In Dr. Done's analysis, a
"data set" is a reported risk ratio between Bendectin use and a defect. Some
studies appear several times in Dr. Done's analysis because he reports relation-
ships for more than one type of defect. Other studies appear only once. There
were a total of 106 data sets, all apparently given equal weight in constructing
statements such as the one quoted above. Id. at 1052.
Judge Brown also noted that: "Although Dr. Done stated in his report that
'92%' of the studies are compatible with an increase, he did not mention in his
report that the studies were also compatible with a decrease (a proposition
which he readily admits)." Id. at 1053 (citations omitted).
213. Id. at 1059.
214. Id. at 1056.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 1059.
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presented a detailed, particularistic analysis. Epidemiological
studies are, of course, of a type reasonably relied upon by ex-
perts in the field. Dr. Done's recalculations, however, produced
"new data" that "has not and cannot in many instances be repli-
cated by other experts in the field or even be explained."21 7 Be-
cause Dr. Done's testimony was inadmissible under Rules 702
and 703, the plaintiffs could not meet their burden of proof on
the issue of causality and the court granted the defendant's
summary judgment motion.218
The testimony Dr. Done proffered in DeLuca presents a par-
ticularly difficult case. From a validity point of view it is tempt-
ing to agree with the judge's conclusion. At several points the
judge implied that the basic flaw in Done's analyses was that
neither defense nor plaintiff experts were able to replicate a
number of Dr. Done's conclusions. 219 This inability to replicate
the data, however, does not present a problem if one can trace
Dr. Done's methods with sufficient specificity to attempt a repli-
cation. Under these circumstances Dr. Done's conclusions would
be falsifiable and, in this core sense, scientific.220 Because a
substantial number of Dr. Done's conclusions were falsifiable,
however, Judge Brown was able to demonstrate how they were
in error. Indeed, it is this detailed demonstration of error that
gives power to the opinion. The court did not question epidemi-
ology as a valid methodology. Rather, the judge challenged Dr.
Done's particular recalculations and the "new data" these sus-
pect recalculations generated. At this level of analysis the court
found Dr. Done's testimony to be flawed largely because it was
not a neutral rendition of the epidemiological evidence concern-
ing Bendectin. The judge depicted Dr. Done as a "party witness"
who designed his analysis to advance his employer's case. Less
apparent, however, is whether Dr. Done's testimony was signifi-
cantly different from that of experts in other cases and whether
this level of analysis casts doubt on the admissibility of a great
deal of expert testimony.
This question is unlikely to be answered any time soon.
Although the Third Circuit demonstrated particular concern for
the dangers of devising a special rule for Bendectin cases, Judge
Brown did just this on remand. The judge noted that ordinarily
the inclusion and exclusion of certain data is a matter for the
217. DeLuca, 791 F. Supp. at 1059.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 1048, 1059.
220. See Black et al., supra note 17, at 68-70.
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battle of the experts but in this case, Dr. Done's plaintiff-lean-
ings, combined with the errors and uncertainties in his calcula-
tions, threatened to confuse the jury.221 It is hard to imagine
that this consideration would carry as much weight if the scien-
tific evidence is not fully developed and, therefore, the errors in
the expert's analysis are not so obvious. Likewise, the impor-
tance the trial court placed on the fact that Dr. Done had not
published his work in a peer review journal was inevitably influ-
enced by the existence of a large body of published research on
Bendectin. The lack of publication would not weigh so heavily if
there were very little published research.222 Most important,
such a detailed analysis of an expert's proferred testimony is un-
likely to occur in more than that handful of cases in which the
courts have become particularly concerned with issues of judi-
cial efficiency and jury confusion.
3. Summary
The rejection of epidemiological evidence in Lynch and
DeLuca again indicates the uncertain nature of admissibility de-
terminations under a Daubert-like analysis. The proffered testi-
mony of both Drs. Done and Swan presented validity problems.
Scientific validity, however, encompasses a complex set of con-
cepts and is always a matter of degree. It is difficult to pinpoint
exactly why the courts found that this testimony was so invalid
as to be inadmissible. Dr. Done's situation is particularly in-
structive. Even were one to conclude that the trial judge's opin-
ion fairly reflects Dr. Done's proffered testimony, this at best
supports excluding 50%, 60% or perhaps even 80% of his testi-
mony on scientific validity grounds. It does not, however, fairly
support the exclusion of all Dr. Done's testimony. Importantly,
221. DeLuca, 791 F. Supp. at 1058.
222. Most debate over the peer review process concerns its ability to monitor
the scientific validity of reported findings. See, e.g., Thomas S. Burack, Of Reli-
able Science: Scientific Peer Review, Federal Regulatory Agencies, and the
Courts, 7 VA. J. NAT. REsoURcEs L. 27 (1987). In this regard, the value of peer
review is frequently overrated, as any academic who has been a reviewer can
attest. Less frequently noted is that publication in a reputable peer review
journal imposes a style of discourse that encourages a relatively conservative,
dispassionate, and neutral presentation rarely found in trial testimony. Peer
reviewed, published articles are less likely to overstate or understate the value
of a particular finding or use causal language to describe their results. See Dan
L. Burk, When Scientists Act Like Lawyers: The Problem of Adversary Science,
33 JuRImETRcs J. 363, 368 (1993); Robert Rosenthal & Peter David Blanck,
Science and Ethics in Conducting, Analyzing, and Reporting Social Science Re-
search: Implications for Social Scientists, Judges, and Lawyers, 68 IND. L.J.
1209, 1212 (1993).
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neither Lynch nor DeLuca made clear why the problems with
the proffered testimony did not go to weight rather than admis-
sibility. A full understanding of these opinions lies beyond ques-
tions of scientific validity and even beyond questions of
admissibility.
V. REASONS FOR RESTRICTIVE ADMISSIBILITY
RULINGS
Why have courts been so willing to make restrictive admis-
sibility rulings in Bendectin cases? In part, the answer can be
found in the objectives courts attempt to achieve by restricting
the scope of admissible scientific testimony and in the special
problems mass torts pose. There are at least two reasons to re-
strict the admissibility of scientific evidence. First, restricting
this evidence fosters judicial efficiency. If a party's scientific ar-
guments are without merit, excluding them minimizes the ex-
penditure of resources required to resolve the issue and
husbands scarce judicial resources for the resolution of closer
questions.223 A second reason to restrict this testimony is that
juries224 will likely be unable to distinguish between reliable
and unreliable evidence.225 Although juries may be good
factfinders with respect to lay testimony, some argue that their
lack of specialized knowledge renders them incapable of assess-
ing the merits of expert testimony.226 Restrictions on admissi-
bility reduce the probability that "a credulous jury will now and
again transform scientific dust into gold."227
223. See Sanders, The Bendectin Litigation, supra note 24, at 301.
224. On the question of whether the judge or jury is a better factfinder, see
Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Are Twelve Heads Better Than One?, 52 LAw & CoNTEMP.
PROBS. 205, 217-18 (1989); Richard Lempert, Civil Juries and Complex Cases:
Taking Stock after Twelve Years, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYS-
TEm 181 (Robert Litan ed., 1993); Robert MacCoun, Inside the Black Box What
Empirical Research Tells Us About Decisionmaking by Civil Juries, in VERDICT:
ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 137 (Robert Litan ed., 1993); Sanders, From
Science to Evidence, supra note 25, at 82.
225. "The principal argument for reviewing expert testimony is the concern
over jurors' ability to discount unreliable expert testimony appropriately."
Faigman, supra note 52, at 881.
226. See generally HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 13.
227. Id.; see THE EVOLVING ROLE OF STATISTICAL ASSESSMENTS AS EVIDENCE
IN THE COURTS 150 (Stephen E. Fienberg ed., 1989) [hereinafter THE EVOLVING
ROLE]. In Turpin v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the court cited jury
confusion as one of the reasons for closely reviewing scientific evidence. 959
F.2d 1349, 1352 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 84 (1992).
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These considerations apply with special force to mass torts,
such as the Bendectin litigation. The many congregations228 of
substance-related mass torts229 that have emerged over the last
decade and a half are a new phenomenon of the tort system. The
size and scope of these cases have placed enormous pressures on
the judicial process and judges have reacted by seeking out new,
efficient ways to dispose of them. A first step toward this goal is
procedural rationing. Courts have used class actions under Rule
23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,230 consolidation
under the Multi-District Litigation Act,231 and consolidation of
cases for trial under Rule 42 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure232 in the Bendectin cases and other mass torts. Courts
have likewise engaged in substantive rationing.233 In situations
such as asbestos exposure, the courts, reasonably confident that
228. On the concept of case congregations, see Marc Galanter, Case Congre-
gations and Their Careers, 24 LAw & Soc'y REV. 371 (1990); Sanders, The
Bendectin Litigation, supra note 24, at 307.
229. Substance-related mass torts should be distinguished from mass torts
generated by a single event such as an airplane crash.
230. FED. R. Civ. P. 23; see Richard A. Chesley & Kathleen Woods Kolodgy,
Mass Exposure Torts: An Efficient Solution to a Complex Problem, 54 U. CIN. L.
RVv. 467, 490-96 (1985); Linda S. Mullenix, Class Resolution of the Mass-Tort
Case: A Proposed Federal Procedure Act, 64 TEx. L. REV. 1039, 1043 (1986).
231. Multi-District Litigation Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1988). For discussions
of consolidation of multi-district litigation, see DAVID F. HERR, MULTIDISTRICT
LITIGATION: HANDLING CASES BEFORE THE JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTrDIsTICTr
LITIGATION (1986); Cornelius J. Moynihan, Jr., Multiple Products Liability Suits
and Their Collateral Estoppel Aspects, 73 MAss. L. REV. 83 (1988); Blake M.
Rhodes, The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation: Time For Rethinking,
140 U. PA. L. REV. 711 (1991); Joan Steinman, Law of the Case: A Judicial
Puzzle in Consolidated and Transferred Cases and in Multidistrict Litigation,
135 U. PA. L. REV. 595, 622-26 (1987).
232. FED. R. Civ. P. 42. See generally Linda S. Mullenix, Beyond Consolida-
tion: Postaggregative Procedure in Asbestos Mass Tort Litigation, 32 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 475, 500 (1991).
233. For a thoughtful early discussion of these and other devices designed to
deal with mass torts, see Jack B. Weinstein, Preliminary Reflections on the
Law's Reaction to Disasters, 11 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (1986). Courts continue
to explore different means of rationing law in mass tort cases. Recent initia-
tives include attempts to create mandatory limited fund class actions, (see In re
Joint Eastern and Southern Dist. Asbestos Litig., 14 F.3d 726, 728 (2d Cir.
1993)), the settlement of claims of future plaintiffs, (see Carlough. v. Amchem
Products, Inc., 5 F.3d 707, 710 (3d Cir. 1993); $4.75 Billion Settlement Proposed
for Silicone Breast Implant Cases, Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) 1 (Septem-
ber 14, 1993) (settlement of all existing and future breast implant cases)) and
the use of the All Writs Act to prohibit some claimants from bringing claims in
state courts (see In Re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litig., 996 F.2d 1425,
1431 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1125 (1994)). All these means share
a common feature: they deny individual claimants the right to a separate, indi-
vidualized trial of their cause of action.
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many plaintiffs have valid claims, have frustrated defendants'
efforts to tie up the legal system by relitigating previously tried
issues23 4 or demanding a separate trial for each claimant. 23 5
Conversely, in the Bendectin cases, the courts became increas-
ingly certain that plaintiffs did not have valid claims and sought
to prevent separate trials for those individual plaintiffs who had
not litigated their claims in a 1985 consolidated trial in the
Southern District of Ohio.23 6 Admissibility rulings provided one
of the few devices available to achieve the goal of non-suiting
these plaintiffs.
Likewise, concern about the jury's ability to understand sci-
entific evidence is particularly salient in mass tort cases. Here,
as in any lawsuit where multiple juries try similar facts, an in-
ability to understand the evidence may produce inconsistent re-
sults. In most situations inconsistent verdicts can be explained
in terms of unique facts presented in one case and not another.
In mass tort cases, however, the outcome frequently turns on
questions of general causation and inconsistencies are not easily
hidden.237 Concerns about jury inconsistency echoes through
234. Offensive collateral estoppel has proven to be an unsuccessful device to
achieve the goal of improving efficiency in mass tort cases. Michael D. Green,
The Inability of Offensive Collateral Estoppel to Fulfill It's Promise: An Exami-
nation of Estoppel in Asbestos Litigation, 70 IowA L. Rav. 141, 186-87, 207-12
(1984) [hereinafter Green, Offensive Collateral]; see Setter v. A.H. Robins Co.,
748 F.2d 1328, 1330 (8th Cir. 1984); Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 681
F.2d 334, 340-41 (5th Cir. 1982). Other tactics have been more successful. In
Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., the New Jersey Supreme Court
ruled that the defendant could not raise a state-of-the-art defense in an asbes-
tos products liability action. 447 A2d 539, 542 (1982). Although the court
quickly retreated from this position in Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, it did
not overturn Beshada, but restricted it to "the circumstances giving rise to its
holding." 479 A.2d 374, 387-88 (1984). One interpretation of this statement is
that, after a substantial amount of asbestos litigation, the Beshada court en-
gaged in substantive rationing by refusing to allow the defense to use an argu-
ment that had failed repeatedly in the past. See In Re Asbestos Litigation, 829
F.2d 1233, 1243-44 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1029 (1988).
235. See Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 751 F. Supp. 649, 651-52, 662
(E.D. Tex. 1990) (rejecting an individual-by-individual approach to damage
awards in a class action suit); Deborah Hensler, Resolving Mass Toxic Torts:
Myths and Realities, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 89, 90, 103-04 (1989) (discussing the
development of aggregation in mass claims).
236. In Re Richardson-Merrell, Inc. "Bendectin" Products Liability Litig.,
624 F. Supp. 1212, 1250 (S.D. Ohio, 1985), affd sub nom., In Re Bendectin Li-
tig., 857 F.2d 290 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1006 (1989).
237. See, e.g., Green, Offensive Collateral, supra note 234, at 215-20 (dis-
cussing concerns of inconsistent jury verdicts). Professor Green gives an exam-
ple of jury inconsistency in a mass tort case where five separate juries heard the
same evidence on questions common to five asbestos cases tried simultaneously
in the same courtroom against twelve defendants in 1982. Id. at 221-22. In
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the Bendectin cases, including Lynch 238 and Brock.239 Inconsis-
tency may, of course, reflect the fact that a trial poses a particu-
larly close fact pattern and that reasonable juries may differ
about the correct outcome. If so, over time jury verdicts should
produce outcomes that reflect the underlying strength of the
parties' case. 240 The verdicts will define the expected value of a
case and, if that value is low enough, past verdicts will deter
future claimants. 241 Faced with this type of inconsistency,
courts might wish to facilitate settlements but would not neces-
sarily want to interfere with the trial process.
Inconsistency may reflect a more fundamental problem,
however: that an unacceptable percentage of juries are reaching
"incorrect" verdicts and, therefore, the verdicts as a group do not
reflect the merits of the issue. Some Bendectin opinions evi-
dence a belief that jury verdicts for the plaintiff were errone-
ous. 2 42 The restrictive admissibility opinions reflect a judicial
response to special interrogatories the juries disagreed about whether some or
all of the products were defectively designed and marketed; whether asbestos
exposure was the sole cause of mesothelioma; whether the defendant, Johns-
Manville, was grossly negligent; and the date on which the defendant should
have foreseen the dangers associated with work-place asbestos exposure. Id. at
222. As to this latter determination, the jury answers ranged from 1935 to
1965. Id. at 222-23, 228-35.
238. Lynch v. Merrell-Nat'l Lab., 646 F. Supp. 856, 861-62 (D. Mass. 1986),
affd, 830 F.2d 1190 (1st Cir. 1987).
239. Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 874 F.2d 307, 310 (5th
Cir.) (noting that inconsistent jury verdicts suggest that appellate courts should
resolve such questions), modified, 884 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494
U.S. 1064 (1990); see Turpin v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 959 F.2d
1349, 1349 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 84 (1992); DeLuca v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 951-52 (3d Cir. 1990), affd, 6 F.3d
778 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 691 (1994).
240. A question related to verdict consistency is damages consistency. Once
the defendant's liability has been adjudicated or conceded, one intriguing solu-
tion to damage inconsistency is to average damage awards from a representa-
tive sample of cases chosen for trial and apply this result to untried cases. The
court in Cimino v. Raymark Industries adopted this approach. 751 F. Supp.
649, 664-65 (E.D. Tex. 1990). This solution greatly reduces transaction costs,
produces a better estimate of the plaintiffs' "true" damages than any individual
verdict, and promotes fairness between different plaintiffs. See Glen 0. Robin-
son & Kenneth S. Abraham, Collective Justice in Tort Law, 78 VA. L. REV. 1481,
1490-96 (1992); Michael J. Saks & Peter David Blanck, Justice Improved: The
Unrecognized Benefits of Aggregation and Sampling in the Trial of Mass Torts,
44 STAN. L. REV. 815, 815 (1992).
241. See Galanter, supra note 228, at 388-93; Francis McGovern, Toward a
Functional Approach for Managing Complex Litigation, 53 U. CHi. L. REV. 440,
478-83 (1986).
242. In Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., for example, the court
was concerned that inconsistent verdicts would over-deter defendants and thus
hinder the development of new drugs. 874 F.2d 307, 310, modified, 884 F.2d
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belief that, left alone, too many juries will reach an incorrect
outcome. Judges243 and others244 are particularly suspicious of
the jury's ability to arrive at a correct decision in trials involving
the expert presentation of complex technological and scientific
questions, trials that typify much of mass tort litigation. The
outcome of the Bendectin trials do little to alleviate this concern.
Of the twenty jury trials that have reached a verdict on the mer-
its, eight resulted in a plaintiff victory.245 This 40% success rate
mirrors the overall success rate in product liability cases. 246
Thus, the one-sided nature of the scientific evidence has not re-
sulted in a perceptible tilt in favor of Bendectin defendants. Re-
strictive admissibility determinations may be interpreted as a
response to these "incorrect" verdicts. They are, from this point
of view, an ad hoc method of jury control.
The twin objectives of achieving an efficient use of judicial
resources in mass tort cases and assisting the jury in under-
standing scientific evidence are meritorious goals. Restrictive
admissibility rulings, however, are a flawed means to these
objectives. With respect to the efficiency goal, the courts have
attempted to achieve with admissibility rulings what they
should be achieving with sufficiency rulings. Indeed, several of
the Bendectin opinions employed a sufficiency analysis. The
Brock court had a relatively easy task because it had a full tran-
script on which to rule. The courts in Lynch and DeLuca did not
enjoy this luxury. Instead, they encountered expert witnesses
prepared to testify that Bendectin more likely than not caused
the plaintiffs injury. If these courts admitted even part of the
proffered testimony, the plaintiff would be able to present a
prima facie case on causation, making summary judgment for
the defendant inappropriate. Therefore, excluding all of the
plaintiffs causation evidence was a necessary prerequisite to
ruling for the defendant as a matter of law. In every Bendectin
opinion that excluded the plaintiffs expert testimony on causa-
tion, the court ultimately entered a judgment for the defendant.
166 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1046 (1990); see Alan Golanski, Judi-
cial Scrutiny of Expert Testimony in Environmental Tort Litigation, 9 PACE
EN TL. L. REv. 399, 465 (1992).
243. See In re Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069,
1084-85 (3d Cir. 1980) (due process considerations may create a complex case
exception to the right to a jury trial).
244. William V. Luneberg & Mark Nordenberg, Specially Qualified Juries
and Expert Nonjury Tribunals: Alternatives for Coping with the Complexities of
Modern Civil Litigation, 67 VA. L. REv. 887 (1981); see Lempert, supra note 224.
245. Sanders, From Science to Evidence, supra note 25, at 9.
246. Id. at 5 n.16.
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This need to find all of the plaintiffs causation testimony
inadmissible helps to explain the restrictive rulings in the
Bendectin cases. The courts, persuaded that the plaintiffs had
insufficient evidence to prevail on the merits, sought to avoid
still another trial that might result in a verdict for the plaintiff
and require them to enter a j.n.o.v., as in Richardson,247
Brock,248 and Ealy.249 Efficiency considerations, therefore, play
an important role in these rulings.
Using admissibility rulings in this way has several draw-
backs. The Bendectin admissibility decisions confuse an already
blurry line between admissibility and sufficiency.250 Sufficiency
necessarily entails a decision about the entire body of the party's
case. Perhaps in a Frye-world admissibility might be thought to
raise a similar question: whether a significant part of the scien-
tific community believes that the case presents an arguable sci-
entific issue. After Daubert, however, admissibility is best
described as a decision about individual pieces of scientific evi-
dence, a conception ill-suited to the global assessment of the sci-
ence supporting a party's position.
Moreover, as others have observed,251 the Bendectin cases
are unique in a number of ways including the existence of an
unusually rich body of epidemiological data, an extensive legal
record produced by hundreds of cases and thirty trials and, per-
haps most fundamentally, a relatively one sided body of scien-
tific evidence. Admissibility criteria created to dispense with
Bendectin cases may present problems in other areas where the
science is neither as well developed nor its weight as one
sided.252 Perhaps this is inevitable when courts bend the rules
of evidence to foster efficiency. If 80% of a party's expert testi-
mony can be excluded, a court will be very reluctant to admit the
last 20% and allow a trial on the merits. The court will find rea-
sons to exclude the remaining 20% which may undermine a so-
247. Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 857 F.2d 823 (D.C. Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 882 (1989).
248. Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 874 F.2d 307 (5th Cir.),
modified, 884 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1046 (1990).
249. Ealy v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 897 F.2d 159 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
498 U.S. 950 (1990).
250. See Susan R. Poulter, Science and Toxic Torts: Is there a Rational So-
lution to the Problem of Causation?, 7 HIGH TECH. L.J. 189, 193-94 (1992).
251. Green, supra note 57, at 677.
252. This risk exists for incautious sufficiency decisions as well. The best
example of this is Brock's requirement that plaintiffs present statistically sig-
nificant epidemiological evidence of a relationship between Bendectin use and
their injury. Brock, 874 F.2d at 313-15.
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phisticated approach to the question of scientific validity.
Moreover, admissibility decisions that require a hearing and
briefing as extensive as Judge Brown's in DeLuca erode effi-
ciency gains.253
Although this Article opposes the use of admissibility rul-
ings to non-suit plaintiffs in order to achieve efficiency goals, it
does recognize that mature congregations, such as the Bendectin
cases, do pose special problems for the courts and society. Spe-
cial solutions should be developed but they should focus on the
problem at hand: the repeated litigation of the same issue in a
mature congregation of cases.25 4 Along these lines, Professor
Berger has suggested several ways to deal with this issue.255
VI. THE JUROR'S PROBLEM AND ALTERNATIVE
SOLUTIONS
Restrictive admissibility rules are also an inappropriate so-
lution to the problems juries have with complex scientific argu-
ments in mass tort cases. A problem does exist, however. A
mounting body of evidence supports the position that jurors do
have a difficult time understanding and assessing expert scien-
tific testimony. For example, the American Bar Association Sec-
tion on Litigation commissioned a Special Committee to study
jury comprehension in complex cases.256 The Committee stud-
ied four complex cases in the areas of sexual harassment, anti-
trust, arson-related insurance fraud, and misappropriation of
trade secrets. The scientific evidence was particularly difficult
in the trade secrets case257 and jurors reported that they had
253. Although there may be relatively few efficiency gains in a particular
case, especially where DeLuca-like hearings are required, the restrictive admis-
sibility rulings may have a chilling effect across the entire congregation of cases
and cause plaintiffs to postpone or forego litigation that enjoys a slim chance of
success.
254. One possibility would be to define certain bodies of knowledge as "social
framework" information and allow the court to instruct the jury on this frame-
work as the court instructs the jury on the "legal framework," it should use in
deciding the case. See Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Social Frameworks:
A New Use of Social Science in Law, 73 VA. L. REv. 559 (1987).
255. See Margaret A. Berger, Procedural Paradigms for Applying the
Daubert Text, 78 MINN. L. REV. 1345 (1994).
256. SPECIAL COM ITrEE ON JURY COMPREHENSION, JURY COMPREHENSION
IN COMPLEX CASES i-ii (1989) [hereinafter JuRY COMPREHENSION]. The Commit-
tee engaged Elizabeth Loftus, Jane Goodman and Edith Green to conduct the
study. Id.
257. This judgment is based on Richard 0. Lempert's article, Civil Juries
and Complex Cases: Taking Stock after Twelve Years. See Lempert, supra note
224. Lempert examined thirteen complex cases and rated each on a three point
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trouble understanding the facts. The authors of the report con-
cluded the following:
[Alithough one plaintiffs' attorney suggested that jurors would not
need to understand the chemical processes in dispute to decide this
case, it seems apparent that some ability to comprehend and evaluate
the technical information was in fact, imperative.
It is not clear that jurors-even those employed as engineers who
had completed college courses in chemistry-had that ability. Even
these jurors felt overwhelmed by the technical nature of the evidence.
Less educated jurors suggested that they were completely "out of their
league."2
5 8
The jury also had difficulty applying the facts to the jury in-
structions to determine whether the facts established the
claims.259
The fact that 40% of the juries that reached the merits of
the Bendectin cases found for the plaintiff is not inconsistent
with the jury's experience in the trade secret case. Interviews
with jurors in one Bendectin trial indicated that they also had
difficulty understanding the scientific evidence.260 A detailed
analysis of six Bendectin trial transcripts indicated some of the
reasons jurors have difficulty with the scientific evidence. Most
importantly, the trial structure itself makes it very difficult to
weigh evidence and, at least within the tort context, to separate
the scientific analysis of causation from other elements of the
tort.2 6 1 Many factors contribute to produce this result.262 The
parties typically employ experts whose objectivity is therefore
suspect. Although both plaintiff and defense experts may testify
concerning exactly the same scientific studies and findings, the
structure of trials separates their testimony, sometimes by
many days. Frequently, a roughly equal number of experts from
each side testify on each scientific issue, producing a perception
that real conflict exists within the scientific community on
nearly all questions.263 Because the parties focus on the science
that they believe best supports their position, the jury is likely to
difficulty scale: low, moderate, and high. Id. at 185-90. The trade secret case
and two others were scored high. Id. at 185-90, tbl. 6.1.
258. JURY COMPREHENSION, supra note 256, at 103.
259. Id. at 54. Jurors in other complex cases have similar problems when
the science is difficult to understand. See Sanders, Jury Deliberation, supra
note 101, at 49-51.
260. Id. at 45.
261. Sanders, From Science to Evidence, supra note 25, at 61.
262. For a valuable discussion of the shortcomings of present methods of
introducing expert testimony, see Samuel Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 Wis. L.
REv. 1113 (1991).
263. Sanders, From Science to Evidence, supra note 25, at 40.
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conclude that all types of scientific evidence are equally proba-
tive to the issue in dispute. 264
Ironically, the problem courts have attempted to correct
through restrictive admissibility rulings is, in part, a product of
the Rules of Evidence themselves. For example, under Rule 703
experts may base their opinion on facts or data of a type reason-
ably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming
opinions on a subject. Any published articles the expert relied
on would ordinarily be hearsay unless admitted under some ex-
ception such as the Learned Treatises exception. Even when ad-
mitted under this exception, however, "the statements may be
read into evidence but may not be received as exhibits."265 As a
consequence, the jury does not have the ability independently to
examine and assess statements those works contain. Rather, it
must view them through the filter of party advocacy, a fiter that
makes it very difficult to assess the weight of scientific opinion
on an issue.
All of these difficulties reflect a more general problem with
the presentation of scientific evidence. Much of what goes on at
trial in America is a process of deconstructing science. As Peter
Schuck has noted, law and science are in some ways competing
cultures, each with its own set of central values, incentives,
techniques, biases and orientations.266 Although science and
law share a wide range of cultural values, differences do exist.
The core values of these two cultures reflect these differences.
Whereas science's central value is truth, law's central value, at
least in its judicial manifestation, is justice.26 7 Law does not
pursue justice as an abstract ideal, however, but in a context
that acknowledges the existence of competing views of what con-
stitutes a just outcome and allows these competing views to con-
tend for supremacy within an adversarial trial. The differences
between the two cultures create tensions and contests for domi-
264. For example, several jurors interviewed from the Havner Bendectin
trial perceived the epidemiological evidence to be no more probative than
animal studies or in vitro studies on the question of whether the drug is a ter-
atogen. Sanders, Jury Deliberation, supra note 101, at 62.
265. FED. R. EviD. 803(18).
266. Peter Schuck, Multi-Culturalism Redux: Science, Law and Politics, 11
YALE L. & Pot'Y REv. 1 (1993) (discussing the differing cultures of science, law
and politics).
267. Id. at 21; see Sheila Jasanoff, What Judges Should Know About the So-
ciology of Science, 32 JuRmmTRcs J. 345, 354 (1992) (making the same
distinction).
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nance.268 In the courtroom, the battle frequently involves at-
tacking the scientific culture itself by focusing on its biases, its
implicit assumptions, and the many ways it inevitably fails to
live up to its own ideals of rigorous methodology and
objectivity.269
As Sheila Jasanoff has noted, scientific discoveries, like
other types of knowledge, are premised on underlying assump-
tions and conventions that remain in the background until con-
troversy erupts.270 The assumptions include both experimental
and interpretative conventions. In ordinary scientific conversa-
tions these assumptions lie in the background and scientists
speak of things as being true or false. Because scientific knowl-
edge, like other forms of knowledge, is constructed by a commu-
nity of individuals, it can be deconstructed, pulled apart by
questioning each assumption, each shared understanding, and
each indeterminacy that inevitably infects even the most art-
fully crafted research. Indeed, many of the admissibility battles
discussed in this Article reflect exactly this type of deconstruc-
tion and it is important to note that both plaintiffs and defend-
ants, motivated by a lawsuit, actively participate in this process.
The adversarial trial is particularly well suited to such an effort,
which, in this context, is its greatest weakness:
Adversarial process is indeed a wonderful instrument for deconstruct-
ing "facts," for exposing contingencies and hidden assumptions that
underlie scientific claims, and thereby preventing an uncritical accept-
ance of alleged truths. The adversary process is much less effective,
however, in reconstructing the communally held beliefs that reason-
ably pass for truth in science. Cross-examination, in particular, un-
duly privileges skepticism over consensus. It skews the picture of
science that is presented to the legal factfinder and created an impres-
sion of conflict even where little or no disagreement exists in
practice.2 7
1
From this perspective the problem confronting the courts in-
volves more than simply assessing the validity of a particular
fact, method, or conclusion. Rather, the court must find a bal-
ance between the pursuit of justice in an environment of adver-
268. [E]xpert testimony can be perceived to be a challenge to certain
fundamental concepts implicit in the structure of trials in the common
law tradition, which calls into question whether the common law mode
of trial prevalent in the United States can accommodate expert testi-
mony without substantial change.
Ronald J. Allen & Joseph S. Miller, The Common Law Theory of Experts: Defer-
ence or Education?, 87 Nw. U. L. REv. 1131, 1131 (1993).
269. Schuck, supra note 266, at 18.
270. Jasanoff, supra note 267, at 347-48.
271. Id. at 353-54.
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sarial legalism and respect for science's culture, values and
assumptions.
If the heart of the problem confronting juries is that the law
so successfully deconstructs scientific findings that juries find it
very difficult to assess the relative merits of any position and
ultimately begin to discount the value of scientific "truth" for the
resolution of the problem posed to them,272 restricting the evi-
dence they hear is a problematic cure. This cure runs the inevi-
table risk of balancing the excessively skeptical environment
that ordinary methods create with an uncritical determination
that there is good science and bad science, that the two can be
distinguished, that the trial judge can capably make this distinc-
tion, and that the court can protect the jury by the excluding the
bad.
Undoubtedly, admissibility decisions have a role to play in
excluding marginal "science" from the courtroom.2 73 There are,
however, superior alternatives available in most situations.
These alternatives directly confront the problems that arise
from the undervaluation of "normal" scientific understandings
when litigants introduce science through traditional adversarial
processes.274 They include the use of court-appointed experts
and expert panels, the bifurcation of trials in order to try causal
questions separate from breach of duty questions, and the poten-
272. The Special Committee of the ABA Section of Litigation concluded that
jurors are not too impressed with experts and dismiss many of them as hired
guns. JURY COMPREHENSION, supra note 256, at 40. Other research reflects
similar attitudes. See Neil Vidmar, Assessing the Impact of Statistical Evidence,
A Social Science Perspective, in THE EVOLVING ROLE, supra note 227, at 296-97.
The perception that experts overwhelm jurors simply because they are experts
is unfounded. As a juror in an asbestos case reported: "The expert testimony
was not a real factor in our decision, except in the very backhanded sense that
it lent medical credence to any result." Jane Goodman et al., What Confuses
Jurors in Complex Cases, TRIAL, Nov. 1985, at 65, 68.
273. Jasanoff has noted that much, if not all, of what passes for clinical ecol-
ogy may be excluded because it violates basic canons of science. Jasanoff, supra
note 267, at 355.
274. Of course, the term "normal" is itself difficult to describe. At its core,
however, may reside the idea of an "empiricist repertoire," the conversations
scientists hold when they are not attacking each other's accounts of reality.
Jasanoff, supra note 267, at 348. See generally G. NIGEL GILBERT & MICHAEL J.
MULKAY, OPENING PANDoRA's Box: A SOCOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF ScrEsIs'S
DISCOURSE (1984). "Normal" science may occasionally cease to exist in an area
where science itself becomes so politicized that the scientific community divides
into camps that constantly attack the other side's account of reality. Reveal-
ingly, this sometimes occurs when the law "captures" an area of science and
uses it to resolve very controversial disputes. See ELEANOR P. WOLF, TRIAL AND
ERROR: THE DETROIT SCHOOL SEGREGATION CASE 335 n.34 (1981).
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tial use of specialized science courts and blue ribbon juries.275
Each of these alternatives would either reduce the perception
that science is mostly conflict with little consensus or reduce the
degree to which the central scientific value of truth is pitted
against the core legal value of justice.27 6
CONCLUSION
Mass torts continue their relentless assault on our common
law tort system. They have forced us to rethink accepted meth-
ods of proving causation, the appropriate measure of damages
and even the system's fundamental commitment to an individu-
alized trial of each plaintiffs case.277 Many mass torts create a
pair of problems for the court system. They consume judicial re-
sources and pose complex scientific questions that frequently
confuse juries. The increased use of expert scientific witnesses
that has accompanied the rise of mass torts has prompted
charges that many of these witnesses are introducing "junk sci-
ence." The Supreme Court crafted its decision in Daubert
against this background. From a narrow perspective, Daubert
simply resolved a longstanding issue in the law of evidence by
holding that the Federal Rules of Evidence superseded Frye.
From a wider perspective, the opinion represents an attempt to
define, or perhaps redefine, the relationship between science
and the law.
The American legal system, both in its judicial and regula-
tory capacities, has constructed a set of structures that facilitate
attacks on science and undermine trust in the judgment of the
scientific community.278 In one sense Daubert attempted to
redefine this relationship. By placing the concept of scientific
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validity at the center of admissibility decisions, Daubert invoked
scientific understandings of what constitutes good and bad sci-
ence. The Court recognized that for science to be useful the law
must attend to more than the scientist's conclusion. The legal
system must, to some degree, be attentive to the scientific
method itself. It must interpret scientific conclusions in the con-
text of the methods and culture which precipitated them.
This very change, however, reveals the degree to which
many restrictive rulings in the Bendectin cases cannot be justi-
fied from the perspective of scientific validity. These opinions
are better explained in terms of two other goals: achieving the
efficient resolution of mass torts and responding to the perceived
inability of juries to understand and apply complex scientific
analyses. The Ninth Circuit's Daubert opinion is an example of
this response. It is not surprising that the judiciary has reached
for whatever tools are readily at hand in an attempt to deal with
these problems. This Article has argued that restrictive admis-
sibility rulings are not the best way to achieve these objectives.
Restrictive admissibility rulings do resolve the problems created
by the repeated litigation of the same factual question. They do
so, however, at the cost of confusing the issues of sufficiency and
admissibility and of casting a shadow of uncertainty over
whether similar rules may be applied in other circumstances.
To the degree courts do require more efficient ways of resolving
individual cases in mature mass torts, they should develop suffi-
ciency rules specific to this need.
The problem of jury comprehension of complex scientific ar-
guments presents a more complex issue. Sometimes parties do
attempt to introduce testimony so lacking in validity that exclu-
sion is appropriate because the testimony threatens to cloud the
issue and confuse the jury. Even with respect to Bendectin liti-
gation, however, an area that some have pointed to as an exam-
ple of "junk science," 279 it is difficult to justify the exclusion of
the plaintiffs entire case on scientific validity grounds. More
importantly, marginal science is not the primary source of jury
difficulties with complex scientific arguments. The heart of that
problem lies not in the arguments of expert witnesses but rather
in the structures and processes of adversarial adjudication that
systematically disadvantage the cultural values of science. It is
there that we should seek a remedy.
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